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I have failed my way into success. That
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was Rahul Pande. I had gotten offers
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from all the big tech companies, Google,
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Facebook, and Microsoft. He's a software
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engineer who went from almost getting
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fired through an acquisition. And they
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told me and said, "Hey, we are going to
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get acquired by you're going to do a
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full round of interviews next Monday to
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getting promoted to staff at Meta in his
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20s." I interviewed him so that we could
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learn from that experience. The thing I
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wish I realized way way earlier in my
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career is that and he was very honest
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with his entire career story. I came in
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with like this attitude of like okay I
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should be like one of the best engineers
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and then getting rejected for the same
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promotion twice was a real setback. What
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portion of your career growth do you
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think was luck?
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The beginning of your career is unusual.
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you went to Stanford but you joined a
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startup immediately and it looks like uh
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a very small startup. What's the story
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behind you joining a startup right out
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of college? The story is in my fifth
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year at Stanford I was at the school for
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5 years doing an undergrad and master's
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degree. I met in that fifth year. One of
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the reasons I actually decided to stick
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around for that fifth year is because I
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felt like I hadn't really made any
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faculty connections and Stanford just
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like any other top institution is famous
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in part because of amazing instructors
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and faculty who were doing
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groundbreaking research. And I felt like
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what a shame if I leave this institution
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and not really understand or take part
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in that. And so the fifth year I was a
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RA like a research assistant in a lab
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with a professor named Yuri Lusco who
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was like a rising star and I thought
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this is a cool opportunity and that led
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to a lot of the work we were doing in
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the lab. He decided to spin it out into
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a company and Stanford actually is
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pretty well known for being fairly
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generous or willing to allow their
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faculty to go out and do companies and
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like have this revolving door with
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academia. And so when that happened, I
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felt like it was almost too good of a
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story to pass up. Like I could be one of
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10 or 20,000 engineers in big tech if I
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go join Google or Microsoft or Meta. And
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I I had received offers at all of them.
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But then I felt like, okay, this is a
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story where I had this connection
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relationship with the professor. He
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trusts me. I trust him. And it just
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feels like a Silicon Valley unique story
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that will it could go really really well
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in which case amazing or worst case it's
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a good story to tell. Yeah. Yeah. And so
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I felt like there was not an hour to use
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and that's kind of why I ended up
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choosing that route. Makes sense. And
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you're early in your career so if it
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fell flat you didn't have a whole lot of
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responsibility. How many people were
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were in that early venture? Yeah. Yeah.
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So there was a professor. He had one
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industry veteran who had been around the
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block and so it was like two founders
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and then there was one other person in
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the lab with me. So two new grads me and
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him and there was one more person. So I
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think I had joined technically aside
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from the two founders as like employee
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number two. So very very early on into
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the company's formation. Right. How did
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you think about risk at that point?
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Because I think a lot of people they're
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evaluating big tech and and versus
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startups and big tech is kind of the you
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know the high expected value path and
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then startups are kind of you know boom
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or bust type of path. So did you think
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about that at all or was it a no-brainer
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to go to the startup? Yeah, I did think
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about that. I think the couple things I
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thought about is one way door versus
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two-way door. Like let me try it out and
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startups. Most things in your career are
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two-way doors in the sense that you try
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it out, you learn something, you
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experiment, and then you can always back
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out. You can always decide to leave the
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startup and then go to big tech if
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needed. So that was one consideration.
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And the other consideration too, if I'm
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being honest, is that I felt like I had
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attained that level of success or that
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level of like approval from big tech.
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And if I hadn't had that, I honestly am
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not sure if I would have done the
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startup. But what I mean by that is like
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I had done an internship the prior
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summer at Facebook, right? Now known as
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Meta in 2013. And then after that
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internship, I had gotten offers from all
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big tech companies. I gotten five offers
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including what I mentioned like Google,
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Facebook and Microsoft, Twitter and
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Square. So five companies in total. And
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so that gave me a lot of confidence that
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okay I I can do it right I can hopefully
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with some preparation I'm hopeful or
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confident in my ability to go back and
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get that opportunity. So there wasn't it
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didn't feel like that much of a risk
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right whereas if I had never gotten that
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big tech offer I think I might have
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really thought twice well let me go get
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a stable job which is going to be much
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more kind of of a known commodity to
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other companies so that if and when I
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decide to move on from my first gig I
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can get a really good job on my second
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gig. But because I already had that
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insurance policy of Stanford on my
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resume along with these other offers, I
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felt like I could be a lot more risk on
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that early in my career. Right. Right.
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That makes sense. So when you went into
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the actual startup itself, would you say
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that it was a good outcome from the
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acquisition or was that kind of like a
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you know aqua hire maybe not the best
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outcome you're hoping for? Yeah, more
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the latter for sure. I think the thing
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with acquisition but I learned that
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acquisition is probably one of the most
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overloaded terms in Silicon Valley. What
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do you mean? Like you could talk about
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acquisition as in like the most famous
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might be or one of the most famous might
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be like WhatsApp getting acquired by
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Facebook for 19 billion. Right. Right.
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In 2014 that's like an acquisition and
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like everyone became filthy. Right.
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Right. Then you also have acquisitions
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or frankly the total opposite which is
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the company effectively failed. Yeah.
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And they're calling an acquisition to
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save the dignity of the founders. Um, I
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think what happened with Postay, the
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company I joined, it was somewhere in
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the middle. It was like a little bit, if
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I'm being honest, closer to the failure
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end, I mean, I probably shouldn't call
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it a failure. It was basically like an
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opportunistic bet that okay, the startup
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that I joined, like I mentioned, it was
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spun out of academic work, right? And so
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I think the bet that we were making is
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that hey we have interesting IP
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intellectual property. We have some
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interesting ideas that are more
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academic, but there's not really a clear
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pathway to generating revenue or
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building a product, right? And so when
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the startup acquisition offer came
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along, like Pinterest, this hot company,
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which already had 100 million users,
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when they came along, it's hey, pairing
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your technology and your technology
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knowhow with our core product and PMF
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product market fit that we already have,
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that could really create something where
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1 plus 1 equals three. That I think was
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uh a really attractive proposition and
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so I think that it we never gave the
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company a chance to really fail like it
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just ended within like eight months of
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formation right and so I think to answer
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your question directly I think uh
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financially it wasn't like an Fri
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outcome like I'm never have to work
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again it certainly wasn't that I
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basically you can kind of think of it as
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me entering in Pinterest with a slightly
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higher package than what a normal new
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grad at Pinterest would have received So
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certainly, I mean, you can't complain.
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Like I feel like I learned a lot about
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Silicon Valley. I learned a lot about
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acquisitions, and I came in with like a
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financially better outcome, but it
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wasn't like a life-changing amount of
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money. Got it. Got it. Yeah. And I think
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one more thing I'll say, which I think
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is really often overlooked is that
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storytelling and the story that you tell
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yourself and the story you tell other
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people, the narrative that you can
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create about what you did, why you did
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it, and why it's interesting. That is
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incredibly powerful. Right. And I think
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honestly more than anything else I feel
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like me being able to tell this story of
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how I was a enterprising young engineer
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22 year 22 years old and I took a bet on
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a startup and I did this crazy story.
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Honestly I get a lot of mileage out of
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that story. Like I mean genuinely I get
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like I learned a lot but also just like
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being able to tell that story and
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explain to people what happened, what I
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learned from it that actually has a ton
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of value. And so one of the things I
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tell people on taro or just in general
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when I mentor people is that if you have
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a choice between A and B and you feel
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like A is the one which will give you
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exposure to more unique opportunity,
[08:06] (486.72s)
unique people, unique stories, that's a
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really good argument to pick option A
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because it just will broaden your
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perspective and give you that
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storytelling ability. So looking back on
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that, let's say I was a new grad and I
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think there's a lot in the audience.
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would you recommend that they pick this
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same opportunity if they had the the
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same decision to make? Yeah, I think it
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depends. So, a couple things that made
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this story unique and why I felt like it
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was the right decision for me at the
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time was number one, I had a lot of
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social proof on my resume already. Like
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I went to Stanford, I had done
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internship at Facebook, which is already
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a huge company at that point. And I felt
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like the founder of a startup was one of
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the best people in the field in the
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world. Right. Right. like undoubtedly
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this person knew more about
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recommendation systems and big data and
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you know we didn't call it machine
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learning back then but effectively
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machine learning back then so it's like
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clearly uh a really good person to just
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be around and and see how they operate
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and so I think if those things are true
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then yeah I mean I would encourage
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anyone who's that early on in their
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career go do the crazy risky thing which
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might fail but I will say that's
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honestly more of the exception than the
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norm so if you're a normal like if you
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are the typical path, which is what I
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would describe as like you went to a
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pretty good school and you got a degree
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and you are like struggling to find your
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first job. Actually, I would recommend
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go and find the biggest brand name you
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can like the biggest company like
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reputable company and go work there
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because I do think there's so much value
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in just acrewing credibility. Right.
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Right. Like go work at Amazon. Go I
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think your first job was Amazon, right?
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Like that's a great first gig. Like go
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work at Amazon. go work at Google if you
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can get in. I think that will set you up
[09:48] (588.96s)
well at a baseline for whatever else you
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want to do later on your career. And if
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you have this exceptional opportunity
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and you're able to justify it by like an
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amazing founder and you already have
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some of that kind of backup plan because
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of your background, I think then it
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makes sense. But for the most part, I
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would just recommend the standard path
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is probably the best because it's a
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standard like that is it's a standard
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for a reason, right? So like probably
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the gend path is what I'd recommend for
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most people. Yeah. Yeah, I agree with
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that. I think you know big tech versus
[10:18] (618.88s)
startups comes up a lot and one of the
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big things about going directly into a
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big brand is instant step change in your
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credibility. You just immediately you
[10:29] (629.12s)
have some prestige on your resume. Yeah.
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there's a lot of value and just even if
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you just went to big tech for like a
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year or two and then you left and even
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if your end goal was to go to startups I
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kind of feel like developing the
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engineering fundamentals while
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collecting that stamp is one of the
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highest EV things that you could do
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knowing now your your situation that
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makes sense you had an extraordinary
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opportunity and you already had the the
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stamps essentially Stanford
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uh Facebook you're kind of already in
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there so that makes sense you got
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acquired by Pinterest and So you're kind
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of uh it was a pretty big company at the
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time, right? Pinterest is maybe a growth
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stage startup at the time. Yeah, around
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400 people. Well, 400 people. Okay. So
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it was bigger than a a true startup
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startup, but it was still much smaller
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than big tech. You know, when you got
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acquired, what was that like? Yeah, I
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think in the end I was happy with it,
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but I will tell you like it was very
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chaotic and very stressful in the
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process to get there because like
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basically the way it worked right the
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behind the scenes is that it was like my
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professor and this other industry
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veteran and they were like much much
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more senior than me and the other new
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grad who joined CO together and like you
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know they had 20 years or more
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experience clearly they were much more
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wellconed much more in the know and so
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the way it worked is that I came into
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work at Kos the startup one day and they
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told me and said hey we are going to get
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acquired by Pinterest. They want to
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interview everyone on the team. You're
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going to do a full round of interviews
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next Monday, which was like a couple
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days away. And so that was like a a big
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change in the company strategy, right?
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Obviously, I was like, we're really
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shutting down. We're going to get
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acquired. And then the last 48 hours,
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the next like 72 hours or whatever was
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extremely stressful because I had, you
[12:12] (732.32s)
know, I was like out of interview prep
[12:14] (734.00s)
for almost a year at that point. And as
[12:16] (736.16s)
you know, you can talk about this later,
[12:17] (737.44s)
but like interview prep is a very
[12:20] (740.08s)
different skill compared to actually
[12:21] (741.36s)
doing the engineering job. And so I was
[12:24] (744.00s)
very worried that I wouldn't actually
[12:26] (746.80s)
get the offer at Pinterest because I
[12:29] (749.52s)
didn't do well in the interview. And in
[12:31] (751.04s)
fact, that almost came true. Like I
[12:32] (752.64s)
remember I did the full round like they
[12:35] (755.44s)
took everyone basically immediately to
[12:37] (757.12s)
the final round interview. Um so I had
[12:39] (759.52s)
like five or six interviews in one day
[12:41] (761.88s)
and they I was borderline. They called
[12:44] (764.56s)
me back in to the SF office again to
[12:47] (767.52s)
say, "Hey, like we know we still had
[12:48] (768.88s)
some doubts or like we had some
[12:50] (770.16s)
questions follow up for you." And I did
[12:52] (772.32s)
two more interviews and luckily I nailed
[12:54] (774.64s)
those. Like I did really well on those
[12:56] (776.48s)
and then I got the offer. But like I was
[12:58] (778.72s)
very worried because like there was a
[13:00] (780.56s)
tech crunch article and there was like a
[13:01] (781.92s)
big news announcement about how
[13:02] (782.96s)
Pinterest has acquired this hot
[13:04] (784.24s)
technology company and it would have
[13:06] (786.48s)
sucked if I if it was like oh I joined
[13:08] (788.80s)
the startup but I didn't actually take
[13:11] (791.28s)
part in the acquisition and all my
[13:13] (793.20s)
friends would have texted me or messaged
[13:14] (794.56s)
me and like oh congratulations and I'm
[13:15] (795.84s)
like ah well I got nothing out of it
[13:17] (797.92s)
because I didn't get an offer. So it
[13:19] (799.36s)
kind of worked out in the end but it
[13:20] (800.88s)
really was pretty stressful process and
[13:22] (802.88s)
it was rushed right. Had you vested any
[13:26] (806.24s)
uh options in your in Cos at the time or
[13:29] (809.36s)
Okay. So you would have gotten nothing
[13:30] (810.48s)
because CO had only been around for
[13:31] (811.76s)
about eight months at that point, right?
[13:33] (813.20s)
Okay. So if you didn't pass that, you
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would have gotten fired essentially and
[13:37] (817.60s)
had gotten no upside from any equity
[13:40] (820.32s)
after that. That's right. Yeah. And so
[13:41] (821.76s)
like literally like when I after that on
[13:44] (824.24s)
this whole like on-site interview, I was
[13:46] (826.64s)
feeling pretty nervous. So then I like
[13:48] (828.32s)
messaged back my old recruiters at other
[13:50] (830.72s)
big tech companies I get offers from and
[13:52] (832.08s)
like start hey like are you still hiring
[13:53] (833.76s)
or can I join cuz I was worried that
[13:55] (835.60s)
that would be a backup let me go back to
[13:57] (837.12s)
Google let me go back to Facebook right
[13:59] (839.04s)
luckily it worked out and then I wanted
[14:01] (841.12s)
to be part of that story and I I knew
[14:02] (842.96s)
the people at COA so I wanted to kind of
[14:04] (844.40s)
join with them so that was like a nice
[14:06] (846.40s)
transition but yeah that was like it
[14:08] (848.48s)
would have been effectively start from
[14:10] (850.64s)
scratch and become like a new grad all
[14:12] (852.24s)
over right was that leak code to to just
[14:15] (855.76s)
a standard algo the interview loop.
[14:18] (858.56s)
Yeah, that was a pretty standard like I
[14:19] (859.84s)
think it was, you know, uh, leak code.
[14:21] (861.52s)
They asked me like what I did on the
[14:22] (862.72s)
startup, what projects I worked on.
[14:24] (864.48s)
Yeah, I know it's like one behavioral
[14:26] (866.80s)
interview, I think, and then a bunch of
[14:28] (868.32s)
we code, man. Okay. You'd have a very
[14:30] (870.48s)
different story if you failed that.
[14:33] (873.68s)
Not nearly as good. Um, so, okay, so you
[14:36] (876.96s)
get into Pinterest. What was the what
[14:39] (879.28s)
was that like? Did they have a ladder
[14:40] (880.96s)
system at that time? Did you get plugged
[14:42] (882.56s)
into a certain level um in terms of
[14:44] (884.80s)
career side of things? Yeah, they they
[14:47] (887.60s)
they had just developed a engineering
[14:50] (890.00s)
leveling system and I came in at L3
[14:52] (892.08s)
which is like their entry level
[14:54] (894.16s)
engineer. So effectively they borrowed
[14:55] (895.76s)
it from Google and Facebook. So L3 is
[14:57] (897.92s)
entry level, L4 is mid-le, L5 is senior.
[15:00] (900.00s)
So I came in at L3 and then I
[15:02] (902.48s)
transitioned away from recommendation
[15:04] (904.72s)
systems or like data engineering which
[15:06] (906.96s)
is effectively what I was doing at the
[15:08] (908.80s)
startup and I transitioned into mobile
[15:10] (910.40s)
development. And so I kind of did a
[15:12] (912.64s)
career reset in some ways by joining
[15:14] (914.96s)
Pinterest and then that led to kind of a
[15:18] (918.32s)
longer ramp up time and I actually ended
[15:19] (919.84s)
up getting rejected for promotion which
[15:21] (921.76s)
we can talk about if that if that's
[15:23] (923.12s)
interesting. Yeah. But yeah, I basically
[15:24] (924.48s)
came in at the L3. I see. So um you
[15:27] (927.36s)
mentioned that you were working in a
[15:28] (928.72s)
different space. How did you choose what
[15:31] (931.12s)
you were working on at Pinterest and
[15:32] (932.48s)
also maybe you can tell us a little more
[15:33] (933.92s)
about what you were working on too.
[15:35] (935.68s)
Yeah, I mean uh the way they put you
[15:38] (938.96s)
into teams is they actually modeled it
[15:40] (940.72s)
off of Facebook. So Facebook has a thing
[15:42] (942.32s)
called boot camp. At least they did back
[15:44] (944.16s)
in the day where it was like a six week
[15:45] (945.60s)
program where you like learn about
[15:47] (947.12s)
engineering fundamentals and you pick a
[15:48] (948.56s)
team. They had something called base
[15:49] (949.84s)
camp is a d like a a play on that. And
[15:52] (952.32s)
the idea of base camp is that it's like
[15:53] (953.84s)
a bridged version like two or three
[15:55] (955.20s)
weeks where you learn about different
[15:56] (956.16s)
teams at Pinterest and you decide what
[15:57] (957.52s)
to go work on. By going through the base
[15:59] (959.92s)
camp process and talking to a bunch of
[16:01] (961.36s)
teams, I kind of made the call that I
[16:03] (963.84s)
didn't want to do things that were more
[16:05] (965.84s)
backend. I wanted to be closer to the
[16:07] (967.92s)
product. I wanted to actually be able to
[16:10] (970.16s)
build something which I could deploy
[16:11] (971.68s)
either at Pinterest or on my own.
[16:13] (973.28s)
Actually, one of the criteria for me is
[16:15] (975.12s)
I wanted to be able to build things on
[16:17] (977.44s)
my own end to end like side projects. I
[16:19] (979.76s)
felt like I wasn't able to properly do
[16:21] (981.44s)
that with my background in like
[16:24] (984.00s)
recommendation systems which I had kind
[16:25] (985.84s)
of built up an expertise in at Stanford
[16:28] (988.24s)
and at CO. You wanted to do that because
[16:30] (990.88s)
uh you had aspirations to start a
[16:32] (992.48s)
company someday. Yeah, I mean I think
[16:33] (993.84s)
vaguely I did have some aspirations like
[16:35] (995.76s)
I think at Stanford like everyone has a
[16:38] (998.08s)
vague aspiration to start a company. So
[16:39] (999.92s)
I there was some element of like yeah I
[16:41] (1001.44s)
want to just at some point do the
[16:43] (1003.36s)
entrepreneurial thing. I think there's
[16:45] (1005.52s)
also just like a more fundamental itch
[16:47] (1007.36s)
of like I want to build something and I
[16:49] (1009.36s)
felt like you can obviously build things
[16:51] (1011.20s)
on the back end too. Like I I did want
[16:53] (1013.44s)
to be an owner of the actual user
[16:56] (1016.88s)
experience as well. That was important
[16:58] (1018.24s)
to me. I just like I wanted to dabble. I
[16:59] (1019.84s)
wanted to build things. The idea of
[17:01] (1021.68s)
being able to have my name on an app in
[17:04] (1024.24s)
the Play Store, like the Android app
[17:06] (1026.08s)
store, that was really compelling. And
[17:08] (1028.08s)
like my whole family was on Android, so
[17:09] (1029.76s)
I could like go home and show them
[17:11] (1031.44s)
here's this app I built and like
[17:12] (1032.80s)
thousands of people could use it. some
[17:14] (1034.16s)
that was like really compelling to me,
[17:16] (1036.08s)
right? And so I felt like if I could
[17:18] (1038.24s)
just learn Android professionally at
[17:21] (1041.28s)
Pinterest with really good people that
[17:23] (1043.12s)
could help accelerate my side project
[17:25] (1045.76s)
endeavors because that was not an option
[17:27] (1047.20s)
at Kosa. There was no such thing as a
[17:28] (1048.72s)
mobile team. Like we were only like
[17:30] (1050.08s)
three, four people total, right? So I
[17:32] (1052.48s)
just wanted to leverage the benefit of a
[17:34] (1054.72s)
bigger company to be able to like double
[17:37] (1057.52s)
dip and do well professionally hopefully
[17:39] (1059.28s)
and also be able to do things on the
[17:41] (1061.84s)
side that I thought were interesting.
[17:43] (1063.12s)
That made sense. When you actually went
[17:45] (1065.52s)
through with it and you you ended up on
[17:47] (1067.28s)
this client side uh uh team, did you
[17:50] (1070.80s)
learn what you wanted to learn or were
[17:52] (1072.72s)
you surprised that it wasn't what you
[17:54] (1074.80s)
were expecting? Yeah, I think I did end
[17:56] (1076.64s)
up learning what I wanted to learn. Like
[17:57] (1077.92s)
there was a really good staff level
[18:00] (1080.24s)
andor engineer who got hired a couple
[18:02] (1082.00s)
months after me. I learned a lot from
[18:03] (1083.68s)
him. Like that was a huge kind of pivot
[18:06] (1086.64s)
I would say in my career. Like I was
[18:08] (1088.00s)
able to just get a ton of mentorship.
[18:09] (1089.20s)
But I will say for the first few months
[18:10] (1090.56s)
it was kind of rough. I didn't know how
[18:12] (1092.00s)
to properly learn. I had not learned how
[18:14] (1094.48s)
to properly learn at that point in my
[18:15] (1095.92s)
career. And so Android, especially at at
[18:19] (1099.68s)
a somewhat mature company where we had,
[18:21] (1101.76s)
you know, I think hundreds of thousands
[18:23] (1103.20s)
of lines in the Android app at that
[18:24] (1104.48s)
point already. It was not a small code
[18:26] (1106.16s)
base. I think I really did struggle like
[18:28] (1108.96s)
as someone who had never done Android
[18:30] (1110.40s)
professionally before. The first few
[18:31] (1111.92s)
months of transitioning were really
[18:33] (1113.68s)
difficult for me. And I think I like
[18:36] (1116.96s)
that that's kind of the reason why I
[18:38] (1118.24s)
think I didn't do well when I initially
[18:39] (1119.84s)
went up for promotion at Pinterest is
[18:41] (1121.36s)
that I was very slow to ramp up and I
[18:43] (1123.76s)
felt like I like read a lot of
[18:45] (1125.20s)
documentation. I read a lot of code but
[18:46] (1126.64s)
I didn't actually modify I didn't write
[18:48] (1128.88s)
much Android code in the first few
[18:50] (1130.96s)
months and that was that was rough but I
[18:52] (1132.56s)
think eventually I got to the point
[18:53] (1133.84s)
where I felt comfortable. So what was
[18:55] (1135.52s)
the key change that took you from not
[18:57] (1137.60s)
landing code and not being effective in
[19:00] (1140.00s)
your onboarding to learning how to learn
[19:02] (1142.56s)
and being effective? Yeah, I think a lot
[19:04] (1144.40s)
of it honestly was just being surrounded
[19:08] (1148.16s)
by really good people. In particular,
[19:09] (1149.84s)
this like L6 staff level engineer who
[19:12] (1152.40s)
had come from Facebook who joined
[19:14] (1154.00s)
Pinterest like I think that person
[19:16] (1156.16s)
really like we start to to pair program
[19:18] (1158.48s)
and that was I think a really big change
[19:20] (1160.80s)
in how I approached the work and I think
[19:22] (1162.72s)
just in general like having a team where
[19:24] (1164.56s)
you're accountable to something. I think
[19:26] (1166.40s)
I did work pretty hard. So like it's not
[19:28] (1168.24s)
like I was fooling around and I didn't
[19:30] (1170.08s)
know anything. I was spending a lot of
[19:32] (1172.24s)
time and I think when you have a team of
[19:34] (1174.32s)
people who are like kind of holding you
[19:35] (1175.84s)
accountable or they're going to judge
[19:37] (1177.60s)
you which is really what was happening I
[19:40] (1180.08s)
think that was a really good fire under
[19:42] (1182.16s)
my butt to actually learn it properly
[19:44] (1184.00s)
and eventually it kind of clicked with
[19:46] (1186.00s)
the combination of mentorship and just
[19:47] (1187.80s)
enough time in the role. Got it. So for
[19:50] (1190.72s)
people who are looking to join a a team,
[19:54] (1194.80s)
they're making a similar decision of
[19:56] (1196.24s)
like what team to join. Maybe they
[19:57] (1197.76s)
already passed interviews. What do you
[19:59] (1199.92s)
think is the most important thing in
[20:01] (1201.84s)
picking a good team? Yeah, I would say
[20:03] (1203.44s)
maybe two things. One is the people part
[20:04] (1204.96s)
of it again is like the amount that you
[20:07] (1207.04s)
learn is going to be dominated by who
[20:08] (1208.40s)
you interact with and like what kind of
[20:10] (1210.24s)
discussion or interaction you have with
[20:12] (1212.08s)
them. And then the second thing I would
[20:13] (1213.44s)
say is how important is that team to the
[20:16] (1216.00s)
company. So one of the reasons actually
[20:18] (1218.24s)
additional reason why I picked Android
[20:20] (1220.16s)
at Pinterest is that one of the big
[20:21] (1221.92s)
initiatives for Pinterest in 2015 when I
[20:24] (1224.48s)
was working there was international
[20:26] (1226.16s)
growth and you're trying to grow a
[20:28] (1228.00s)
consumer app
[20:29] (1229.24s)
internationally the number one way you
[20:31] (1231.36s)
do that the key is going to be Android
[20:33] (1233.84s)
is dominant outside of the US and so I
[20:36] (1236.96s)
knew that the company would allocate a
[20:38] (1238.88s)
lot of smart people a lot of resources a
[20:41] (1241.28s)
lot of money frankly into that domain
[20:44] (1244.16s)
and I felt like if you're adjacent into
[20:46] (1246.80s)
or operating in an area of high growth,
[20:49] (1249.28s)
you will inevitably see some of that
[20:50] (1250.96s)
growth too, right? So, I think the
[20:52] (1252.48s)
combination of those two people and
[20:54] (1254.16s)
where the company is growing, I think
[20:56] (1256.72s)
matters a lot in team selection. Common
[20:58] (1258.80s)
advice I see is a rising tide lifts all
[21:01] (1261.44s)
boats. I've seen some people's careers
[21:03] (1263.80s)
where they they went from, you know, new
[21:06] (1266.96s)
grad to director in five years because
[21:09] (1269.36s)
they were working on the one of the most
[21:11] (1271.92s)
important things for the company and
[21:13] (1273.36s)
they were really delivering. So the
[21:15] (1275.52s)
impact was insane and typically career
[21:18] (1278.88s)
growth's proportional to your your
[21:20] (1280.64s)
impact. So going into the career growth
[21:23] (1283.92s)
side of things, you came in as a as a
[21:25] (1285.84s)
L3. You you mentioned that you had a
[21:28] (1288.56s)
failed promotion. Can you talk me
[21:30] (1290.56s)
through how you eventually got the promo
[21:32] (1292.72s)
and maybe the story behind what you were
[21:34] (1294.56s)
talking about there? Yeah, I mean it's a
[21:36] (1296.84s)
pretty difficult journey, honestly. So I
[21:39] (1299.20s)
got I got the failed promotion. I got
[21:40] (1300.80s)
the feedback. I think honestly that was
[21:42] (1302.16s)
probably legitimate. I think it was a
[21:43] (1303.60s)
year after I was at Pinterest and I
[21:46] (1306.00s)
wanted to go off a promo and it got
[21:47] (1307.28s)
rejected and it was like valid feedback.
[21:49] (1309.44s)
Okay, you've only been doing Android
[21:50] (1310.72s)
professionally for like you know nine
[21:52] (1312.16s)
months at that point and you haven't
[21:53] (1313.92s)
really added you haven't really banned
[21:55] (1315.84s)
that much. That was fair. I went up
[21:57] (1317.84s)
again six months later and I got
[21:59] (1319.68s)
rejected for the promotion again. So
[22:02] (1322.08s)
that was truly demoralizing because I I
[22:04] (1324.00s)
came into Pinterest with like this
[22:05] (1325.44s)
attitude of like okay I came in through
[22:07] (1327.04s)
an aqua hire an acquisition and I should
[22:10] (1330.64s)
be like on top of the world. I should be
[22:12] (1332.56s)
like one of the best engineers and then
[22:14] (1334.48s)
getting rejected for the same promotion
[22:16] (1336.08s)
twice was a real
[22:18] (1338.64s)
um setback. So luckily what happened in
[22:21] (1341.04s)
the second time is I they had like an
[22:23] (1343.44s)
appeal process at at Pinterest. So then
[22:25] (1345.76s)
I was able to work with a manager to
[22:27] (1347.28s)
appeal the promotion and I got I
[22:28] (1348.80s)
actually ended up getting it. So Oh,
[22:30] (1350.72s)
interesting. That was valuable. One of
[22:32] (1352.08s)
the takeaways I learned in that second
[22:34] (1354.00s)
time is a big feedback for me for the
[22:37] (1357.04s)
rejection was that oh on one of the
[22:39] (1359.68s)
projects that you listed in your
[22:41] (1361.28s)
promotion packet, you said that you've
[22:42] (1362.96s)
been working on it for like 16 months
[22:45] (1365.20s)
and they the promotion committee this
[22:47] (1367.28s)
anonymous promotion committee
[22:48] (1368.72s)
interpreted that to mean that I wasn't
[22:51] (1371.84s)
working with urgency or with
[22:53] (1373.36s)
deliberation enough and that was like
[22:56] (1376.56s)
not true. like in the frame like I think
[22:58] (1378.16s)
the framing of it had that framing
[23:00] (1380.00s)
because they kind of interpreted this
[23:01] (1381.44s)
like long duration of the project. But
[23:04] (1384.00s)
then when I clarified that with my
[23:05] (1385.36s)
manager and they were able to like uh
[23:07] (1387.36s)
kind of advocate for me or put up a
[23:10] (1390.48s)
appeal, it it ended up working out. But
[23:12] (1392.80s)
I think that kind of showed me the value
[23:14] (1394.40s)
of like you really need to be clear
[23:16] (1396.56s)
about what you think you're saying. It
[23:18] (1398.80s)
may not always be interpreted that way.
[23:20] (1400.24s)
And so especially for things like career
[23:22] (1402.08s)
growth or like a one-on-one document or
[23:23] (1403.92s)
a promotion document, you have to really
[23:25] (1405.68s)
be clear about get it reviewed by people
[23:28] (1408.32s)
who have been around the block and like
[23:30] (1410.96s)
understand like be open to feedback on
[23:33] (1413.04s)
how things might be interpreted
[23:34] (1414.40s)
differently because you want to avoid
[23:35] (1415.84s)
the situation that I ended up in. Yeah,
[23:37] (1417.84s)
it's it's interesting. You talked about
[23:40] (1420.00s)
duration of the project and how it being
[23:42] (1422.48s)
longer hurt you because I've heard the
[23:45] (1425.68s)
opposite as well. If you have a a
[23:47] (1427.92s)
project that is longer, it's perceived
[23:50] (1430.40s)
as larger scope potentially and
[23:52] (1432.56s)
therefore maybe a bigger undertaking.
[23:55] (1435.44s)
And so I've heard some people say
[23:57] (1437.44s)
actually sometimes it can be
[23:58] (1438.68s)
advantageous for a project to be longer
[24:01] (1441.84s)
durations. Of course, there's no um
[24:04] (1444.44s)
one-sizefits-all thing here. It's all
[24:06] (1446.72s)
about the context and how the story is
[24:10] (1450.48s)
actually told. The color behind it
[24:12] (1452.40s)
matters a lot. Yeah. And this is why I
[24:14] (1454.48s)
think like you have to be really clear
[24:15] (1455.92s)
with your manager about what narrative,
[24:17] (1457.60s)
what story are you trying to tell,
[24:18] (1458.88s)
right? You have to make sure that you're
[24:19] (1459.76s)
aligned with them on that and also
[24:21] (1461.20s)
ideally get feedback from other like
[24:22] (1462.64s)
tech leads or other people who are in
[24:24] (1464.08s)
positions of influence because the same
[24:26] (1466.08s)
project if you've been working on for 16
[24:27] (1467.60s)
months, it could be really impressive.
[24:29] (1469.12s)
Or if it's like this minor experiment
[24:31] (1471.12s)
that people assume should have taken you
[24:33] (1473.12s)
three months, but you've been working on
[24:34] (1474.08s)
for 16 months, that could be held
[24:35] (1475.52s)
against you, right? So I think the devil
[24:37] (1477.12s)
is in details and you have to be really
[24:39] (1479.76s)
like you I I guess like the the learning
[24:42] (1482.00s)
I had is that you can't make assumptions
[24:44] (1484.12s)
about how you are going to be evaluated
[24:47] (1487.60s)
or judged right based off of your own
[24:50] (1490.08s)
interpretation. Like software
[24:51] (1491.12s)
engineering is like social endeavor like
[24:52] (1492.88s)
you have to be able to work with other
[24:54] (1494.24s)
people and figure out how are they
[24:56] (1496.00s)
judging you? What do they think are your
[24:58] (1498.00s)
areas for improvement? And make sure you
[24:59] (1499.84s)
figure that out ahead of time so you're
[25:01] (1501.36s)
not surprised during a performance
[25:03] (1503.04s)
review. One of the last things I want to
[25:04] (1504.72s)
go over for this this u leg of your
[25:06] (1506.96s)
career is usually from L3 to L4 it's all
[25:10] (1510.08s)
about engineering fundamentals and
[25:12] (1512.80s)
technical growth and you mentioned a
[25:15] (1515.04s)
little bit that having a really strong
[25:17] (1517.28s)
mentor was one of the key things that
[25:19] (1519.12s)
helped you level up here in terms of
[25:20] (1520.96s)
your skills. Was there anything else
[25:22] (1522.40s)
that you did that helped you you know
[25:24] (1524.48s)
have a lot more impact or really develop
[25:26] (1526.40s)
those skills quickly going from three to
[25:28] (1528.64s)
four? I think one of the things I
[25:30] (1530.08s)
learned from this mentor which was also
[25:32] (1532.64s)
incredibly valuable for me when I was
[25:34] (1534.16s)
doing my own side projects or like
[25:35] (1535.92s)
publishing apps was this willingness to
[25:38] (1538.76s)
just operate outside of the codebase.
[25:41] (1541.36s)
Like for example I mentioned how the
[25:43] (1543.20s)
Pros codebase even though it was still
[25:44] (1544.64s)
relatively early it was already quite
[25:46] (1546.08s)
mature like compilation like building
[25:48] (1548.48s)
the Android app and deploying to the
[25:50] (1550.08s)
phone it took I think sometimes between
[25:52] (1552.32s)
two and five minutes like it took a long
[25:53] (1553.76s)
time to actually do all this
[25:55] (1555.60s)
compilation. So it was like a very slow
[25:57] (1557.20s)
and painful debug cycle. One of the
[25:58] (1558.72s)
things that the mentor showed me is that
[26:00] (1560.64s)
hey, you can actually create your own
[26:03] (1563.04s)
like mini Android app and make changes
[26:06] (1566.00s)
and like copy over themes as needed, but
[26:08] (1568.40s)
then you can have this sandbox
[26:10] (1570.64s)
environment where the debug cycle is way
[26:12] (1572.40s)
faster, right? And I think that was
[26:14] (1574.64s)
really eye opening for me cuz it it felt
[26:16] (1576.88s)
like making a new app that's like so
[26:18] (1578.64s)
much work. It's like this big ambiguous
[26:20] (1580.24s)
thing. I don't know how to do that,
[26:21] (1581.44s)
right? But when you actually get into
[26:23] (1583.76s)
it, it turns out it's not that hard and
[26:25] (1585.44s)
it will actually meaningfully increase
[26:27] (1587.84s)
your velocity and that fear I had I
[26:31] (1591.20s)
think of like being able to dabble and
[26:33] (1593.04s)
like break things and you know copy
[26:35] (1595.76s)
paste code and modify it over here and
[26:37] (1597.84s)
see what happens. I think that went away
[26:40] (1600.88s)
after a while and which is also like of
[26:43] (1603.12s)
course very valuable for a side project
[26:44] (1604.64s)
because you don't have training wheels
[26:45] (1605.84s)
you don't have any code to already
[26:47] (1607.76s)
modify for a side project right so it
[26:49] (1609.68s)
was very valuable for that and I think
[26:51] (1611.92s)
that change of attitude of like just
[26:54] (1614.00s)
being able to go in and make things and
[26:56] (1616.40s)
break things honestly was probably the
[26:58] (1618.72s)
biggest mindset shift that led to the
[27:00] (1620.96s)
L34 promotion. Yeah, I think a lot of
[27:03] (1623.04s)
that promotion too is about contributing
[27:05] (1625.44s)
more code and having one of the most
[27:07] (1627.60s)
important things for that is like a very
[27:09] (1629.20s)
fast iteration loop. So, okay, you you
[27:12] (1632.40s)
got the promo at Pinterest and I believe
[27:14] (1634.96s)
at this point you you left to Meta. Is
[27:17] (1637.04s)
that correct? Yeah, I left in mid 2017.
[27:19] (1639.36s)
Got it. What made you want to leave
[27:21] (1641.60s)
Pinterest for Meta? I a couple things.
[27:23] (1643.60s)
One is I think Meta was a much much
[27:26] (1646.16s)
bigger company and I felt like frankly
[27:29] (1649.12s)
the engineering brand of Meta was still
[27:31] (1651.20s)
quite a bit stronger just in terms of
[27:33] (1653.12s)
like name brand and being a huge company
[27:35] (1655.60s)
and it was value in that they were
[27:38] (1658.16s)
paying more and I felt like in terms of
[27:40] (1660.32s)
immediate growth at Pinterest I didn't
[27:42] (1662.56s)
see a clear pathway to okay like here's
[27:45] (1665.28s)
how my career is going to rocket ship
[27:47] (1667.92s)
from from where I am now. And so the
[27:50] (1670.40s)
combination of those three led me to
[27:53] (1673.36s)
Okay, let me look around and see if I
[27:54] (1674.96s)
can get a meaningful bump in my career
[27:58] (1678.00s)
promotion or compensation. I do think in
[28:01] (1681.04s)
general early on in career, job hopping
[28:03] (1683.60s)
is more effective at that. Later on in
[28:05] (1685.44s)
career, job hopping is actually
[28:07] (1687.04s)
counterproductive.
[28:08] (1688.64s)
Oh, what makes you say that job
[28:10] (1690.00s)
hopping's counterproductive later in
[28:11] (1691.76s)
career? And as you go up the career
[28:13] (1693.76s)
ladder, most of your impact is going to
[28:15] (1695.68s)
be derived through the influence you
[28:17] (1697.28s)
have on other people rather than
[28:18] (1698.56s)
actually just coding all day every day.
[28:20] (1700.56s)
It is it is rare for like for example a
[28:22] (1702.88s)
staff or principal engineer to just
[28:26] (1706.24s)
crank out so much code that it justifies
[28:28] (1708.96s)
their impact at the company. Usually
[28:31] (1711.12s)
what's going to be happening is you're
[28:32] (1712.24s)
creating frameworks or tools or systems
[28:34] (1714.96s)
that allow other developers to do
[28:37] (1717.84s)
productive work. And so for that kind of
[28:39] (1719.92s)
work, you need to be in a company long
[28:43] (1723.20s)
enough that you have those relationships
[28:45] (1725.52s)
and that trust built out. If you are a
[28:48] (1728.40s)
like staff or principal engineer, it's
[28:50] (1730.72s)
very hard to job hop your way beyond
[28:52] (1732.56s)
that. You have just kind of build out
[28:54] (1734.80s)
that trust and relationship and then you
[28:56] (1736.40s)
get promoted. Whereas early on in career
[28:58] (1738.40s)
as long as you show the competency of
[29:00] (1740.48s)
hey I can write high quality Android
[29:02] (1742.00s)
code I can write highquality production
[29:04] (1744.32s)
code that's that might be enough
[29:06] (1746.24s)
actually for a company to bring you in
[29:08] (1748.72s)
at a higher level or at least a higher
[29:10] (1750.32s)
compensation. I think that aligns with
[29:11] (1751.84s)
my experience as well. I think my my
[29:14] (1754.80s)
promotion from senior to staff I think
[29:17] (1757.52s)
was unusually quick because I had a lot
[29:20] (1760.64s)
of relationships already. A lot of my
[29:22] (1762.64s)
peers had switched companies like very
[29:24] (1764.64s)
very fast but I'd stayed in one place
[29:27] (1767.12s)
one team for a long time. So actually
[29:29] (1769.28s)
that leg came a lot of it was from
[29:31] (1771.68s)
influence and people trusting me and
[29:34] (1774.08s)
knowing I could get a job done at a
[29:36] (1776.00s)
staff level and giving me those
[29:37] (1777.36s)
opportunities which I was lucky to
[29:39] (1779.20s)
receive. But yeah staying at some place
[29:40] (1780.88s)
for a long time gave me more
[29:42] (1782.80s)
opportunities for influence and and that
[29:44] (1784.88s)
kind of luck. One thing I want to ask
[29:46] (1786.32s)
you about cuz you mentioned one thing
[29:47] (1787.76s)
about Meta was uh like more social
[29:50] (1790.24s)
proof, more prestige. Your resume was
[29:53] (1793.36s)
already pretty loaded at the time in
[29:56] (1796.16s)
terms of and Pinterest is not a bad
[29:58] (1798.16s)
brand. You had Stanford. Um you had
[30:00] (1800.96s)
already been at at Meta. So do you feel
[30:04] (1804.40s)
like there was additional value in
[30:06] (1806.56s)
another stamp or was it more for the the
[30:09] (1809.52s)
other aspects of it? Yeah, that's a good
[30:11] (1811.44s)
point. I do think part of it was like I
[30:13] (1813.52s)
still felt Meta as a much bigger like
[30:16] (1816.24s)
everyone in the world had heard of Meta
[30:17] (1817.52s)
or at that point it was Facebook
[30:19] (1819.36s)
everyone had heard of Facebook not
[30:20] (1820.56s)
everyone had heard of Pinterest so part
[30:21] (1821.84s)
of it was maybe like this ego of like
[30:23] (1823.60s)
it's a more well-known brand both for
[30:25] (1825.84s)
the common public and also in terms of
[30:27] (1827.92s)
engineering but I think you're right
[30:29] (1829.28s)
that that was not the highest order bit
[30:31] (1831.36s)
of what I was optimizing for because
[30:33] (1833.04s)
like I had already technically had the
[30:35] (1835.20s)
Facebook name on my resume I had already
[30:38] (1838.64s)
had these other somewhat well-known
[30:40] (1840.56s)
names on in my resume. I think it was
[30:43] (1843.28s)
more I think focused on this feels like
[30:46] (1846.00s)
a place where I can grow my
[30:47] (1847.96s)
career a lot faster at Facebook compared
[30:50] (1850.80s)
to where I was. When you switched from
[30:52] (1852.88s)
Pinterest to Meta, what were the
[30:54] (1854.96s)
cultural differences that immediately
[30:56] (1856.48s)
jumped out to you? I'll start off by
[30:58] (1858.16s)
saying I think they were actually kind
[30:59] (1859.36s)
of similar. Like a lot of the Pinterest
[31:01] (1861.28s)
culture was influenced by a lot of ex ex
[31:03] (1863.36s)
Facebook and ex Google people. So it was
[31:05] (1865.12s)
similar in that sense, but Facebook
[31:06] (1866.40s)
culture was my internship and from
[31:08] (1868.00s)
people who had joined Pinterest from
[31:09] (1869.44s)
Facebook. And you could tell at Facebook
[31:10] (1870.88s)
was like the authentic like taste of it
[31:12] (1872.64s)
had gotten but on steroids. So for
[31:14] (1874.48s)
example like at Pinterest I remember the
[31:16] (1876.72s)
culture was every code review every
[31:19] (1879.20s)
change would be reviewed by at least two
[31:20] (1880.88s)
people and they would actually have
[31:22] (1882.08s)
these thing called herald roles where if
[31:23] (1883.84s)
you modified a particular part of the
[31:25] (1885.44s)
codebase it would automatically add
[31:26] (1886.64s)
reviewers and they were blocking
[31:27] (1887.76s)
reviewers so you couldn't land the code
[31:29] (1889.12s)
until they took a look. At Facebook as
[31:31] (1891.28s)
you probably know like it's actually
[31:33] (1893.04s)
very rare for that to happen. Usually
[31:34] (1894.88s)
all you need is one accept, one LGTM,
[31:38] (1898.00s)
one green check mark and you can land
[31:39] (1899.52s)
it. And so I was actually kind of
[31:41] (1901.52s)
shocked at wait people are just landing
[31:43] (1903.68s)
code that quickly without all the other
[31:46] (1906.24s)
like checks and balances. So then that
[31:48] (1908.00s)
was one big difference. I think people
[31:49] (1909.92s)
were more direct at Facebook. at
[31:53] (1913.20s)
Pinterest. One of the common criticisms
[31:54] (1914.88s)
of the company was that it was kind of
[31:57] (1917.36s)
too nice, which is kind of a weird
[31:59] (1919.12s)
criticism, but like I think what they
[32:00] (1920.88s)
meant to say was that people weren't
[32:03] (1923.04s)
saying the difficult thing around
[32:06] (1926.32s)
feedback or prioritization and then
[32:08] (1928.08s)
therefore projects or people who had no
[32:10] (1930.56s)
business actually staying at the
[32:12] (1932.48s)
company, they stuck around a lot longer.
[32:14] (1934.72s)
M whereas at Facebook I think they were
[32:16] (1936.96s)
actually quite I I don't want to say
[32:18] (1938.64s)
like they were more mean but they were
[32:19] (1939.92s)
definitely a lot more direct around hey
[32:22] (1942.00s)
this doesn't make sense why are you
[32:23] (1943.44s)
doing this let's cut it or kill it and I
[32:25] (1945.28s)
think there was a lot more aggressive
[32:26] (1946.40s)
like pip culture for example at Facebook
[32:28] (1948.72s)
compared to Pinterest right right how
[32:30] (1950.40s)
about the technical stacks like when you
[32:32] (1952.72s)
switch from Pinterest to Meta did you
[32:34] (1954.64s)
have any issues learning Meta's very
[32:36] (1956.64s)
custom stack I mean it's kind of
[32:38] (1958.48s)
interesting because like on paper it was
[32:39] (1959.92s)
quite similar like both as Android dev
[32:42] (1962.56s)
both were using Java there was no Cotlin
[32:44] (1964.80s)
really at the time. So Java there and it
[32:46] (1966.88s)
was still using like Android tooling.
[32:49] (1969.20s)
But I think one of the things that was
[32:50] (1970.56s)
interesting is that Facebook was
[32:52] (1972.08s)
operating at such a scale that they had
[32:54] (1974.40s)
like workarounds for a lot of things.
[32:56] (1976.16s)
They had their own customuilt system
[32:57] (1977.44s)
called buck right that was relative.
[32:59] (1979.12s)
That was very easy for me. And then a
[33:02] (1982.08s)
lot of the ways of doing compilation for
[33:05] (1985.84s)
Android at Facebook was different from
[33:08] (1988.00s)
what I had learned which was exacerbated
[33:11] (1991.44s)
or like made even more pronounced by the
[33:13] (1993.76s)
fact that I was working on a hardware
[33:15] (1995.04s)
team. So I joined a relatively unique
[33:16] (1996.72s)
part of Facebook called Portal. And it
[33:20] (2000.08s)
wasn't called portal all the time. It
[33:21] (2001.12s)
was called building 8. It basically was
[33:22] (2002.72s)
a forked version of Android along with
[33:25] (2005.36s)
like 30 different custom Android apps
[33:27] (2007.36s)
sitting on top of this custom operating
[33:29] (2009.28s)
system. And so the building the build
[33:31] (2011.52s)
system the tooling for that was actually
[33:33] (2013.28s)
very very different not just for
[33:35] (2015.52s)
Pinterest but also just for core of
[33:37] (2017.60s)
Facebook. So that took some time like
[33:40] (2020.16s)
probably it took me like four or five
[33:41] (2021.52s)
months to understand how that even how
[33:43] (2023.12s)
that worked. Got it. Yeah. And for for
[33:44] (2024.80s)
people who don't know, Portal is the
[33:47] (2027.16s)
standalone device that's a video calling
[33:50] (2030.40s)
device that has a screen on it and it it
[33:52] (2032.72s)
sits stationary. It's almost like a
[33:54] (2034.16s)
Google Home. That that's the thing that
[33:56] (2036.16s)
you're talking about, right? That's
[33:57] (2037.28s)
right. I mean, initially you would have
[33:58] (2038.80s)
like we had like literally like an
[34:00] (2040.32s)
Android tablet because we didn't have
[34:01] (2041.76s)
hardware when I first joined. But then
[34:03] (2043.44s)
yeah, like eventually we had custom
[34:04] (2044.96s)
hardware which had our own OS. We it was
[34:07] (2047.20s)
like you call it flashing. You'd flash
[34:08] (2048.80s)
the device with your own OS and on top
[34:10] (2050.40s)
of that you would then put o over
[34:12] (2052.88s)
optimize build of the 30 apps but then
[34:14] (2054.56s)
you're not going to build all 30 apps.
[34:15] (2055.52s)
That would take like literally three or
[34:16] (2056.72s)
four hours. Then you would take the app
[34:18] (2058.24s)
that you're working on like I was
[34:19] (2059.52s)
working on the calling app. So I would
[34:20] (2060.80s)
just build that app and then put that on
[34:22] (2062.40s)
the device. So it's a very kind of
[34:24] (2064.64s)
unique process even for Facebook which
[34:27] (2067.12s)
took a long time to understand and
[34:29] (2069.44s)
actually that was an opportunity like
[34:30] (2070.72s)
you can talk about this later if you're
[34:31] (2071.84s)
interested but I built out this like
[34:33] (2073.52s)
debug tool which was just for people on
[34:36] (2076.24s)
the portal because of how unique the
[34:38] (2078.00s)
setup was and that actually led to a ton
[34:39] (2079.76s)
of impact because I was able to
[34:42] (2082.16s)
understand deeply how the workflow was
[34:44] (2084.48s)
different compared to other internet
[34:45] (2085.76s)
engineers and I was able to build
[34:47] (2087.68s)
something to help with them. How many
[34:49] (2089.04s)
engineers did that speed up? By the time
[34:50] (2090.80s)
I built that tool, like portal had grown
[34:52] (2092.96s)
dramatically. So I think by that point
[34:54] (2094.48s)
like hundreds of engineers in the portal
[34:57] (2097.36s)
org or adjacent orgs were using that
[34:59] (2099.36s)
tool either every day or every week and
[35:02] (2102.32s)
it was probably saving like hundreds of
[35:04] (2104.56s)
hours of engineering time every month.
[35:06] (2106.64s)
Yeah. So I mean to me that sounds like
[35:08] (2108.80s)
IC6 impact or staff impact. So maybe we
[35:11] (2111.92s)
can talk a little bit about career
[35:14] (2114.16s)
growth at Meta. Did were you hired as a
[35:16] (2116.72s)
IC5? So senior or Yeah. Okay. I was
[35:19] (2119.76s)
hired as IC5. Yeah. Oh, so that was
[35:21] (2121.60s)
probably a big part of moving as well.
[35:23] (2123.12s)
Sounds like you got a promotion from
[35:25] (2125.36s)
switching from Pinterest to to Meta.
[35:28] (2128.16s)
Yep, that's right. Did you have to do
[35:29] (2129.60s)
anything special to to get that that job
[35:32] (2132.88s)
hop promo or you just did the interview
[35:35] (2135.12s)
and that was what they proposed? Yeah,
[35:36] (2136.88s)
that's what they proposed. I mean, I
[35:38] (2138.00s)
think I I knew I had done the interviews
[35:39] (2139.52s)
really well. Like I came out thinking
[35:41] (2141.20s)
okay I felt really lucky or I felt
[35:43] (2143.52s)
really good about okay I pretty much
[35:45] (2145.36s)
nailed every problem and I came in in a
[35:48] (2148.08s)
position of strength in a sense I I
[35:49] (2149.68s)
already I already had I think a couple
[35:51] (2151.68s)
pending offers at that point there's a
[35:54] (2154.00s)
com and I had interned at Facebook I
[35:56] (2156.16s)
like had worked at a respectable company
[35:58] (2158.24s)
before which was Pinterest and I think
[36:01] (2161.04s)
the market was hot for Android
[36:02] (2162.48s)
developers so the combination of all of
[36:04] (2164.56s)
that led to just like they wanted to
[36:06] (2166.72s)
give me a compelling offer right you
[36:08] (2168.64s)
went from senior or IC5 to to staff.
[36:11] (2171.76s)
Yeah, maybe you can talk a little bit
[36:12] (2172.96s)
about what you're working on. I
[36:14] (2174.24s)
mentioned I'm work I work on a thing
[36:16] (2176.16s)
called Portal which is a standalone
[36:18] (2178.72s)
hardware video calling device and so
[36:22] (2182.24s)
prior to Portal existing Facebook
[36:24] (2184.00s)
already has a long history of doing
[36:25] (2185.20s)
video calling primarily in the form of
[36:27] (2187.20s)
doing it through messenger. So
[36:28] (2188.60s)
Messenger, the Facebook Messenger app
[36:31] (2191.12s)
already had a fairly mature ecosystem or
[36:33] (2193.92s)
infrastructure around supporting
[36:36] (2196.24s)
crossplatform video calls between
[36:38] (2198.40s)
desktop and mobile, Android, iOS at
[36:41] (2201.04s)
different with different codecs,
[36:42] (2202.80s)
different qualities, different audio
[36:44] (2204.72s)
video codecs, things like that. And so I
[36:46] (2206.48s)
think a lot of the challenge was, hey,
[36:48] (2208.48s)
the step zero is just effectively fork
[36:51] (2211.52s)
off of Messenger and do our own thing
[36:53] (2213.52s)
because we were just kind of an
[36:54] (2214.48s)
experimental project. But then once
[36:56] (2216.00s)
portal had launched and we had you know
[36:57] (2217.68s)
hundreds of thousands of people who were
[36:59] (2219.12s)
using portal every day then there was a
[37:00] (2220.88s)
need to now kind of come back into the
[37:03] (2223.36s)
normal infrastructure because like you
[37:04] (2224.72s)
know obviously the RTC team like the
[37:06] (2226.64s)
video calling infrastructure team at
[37:08] (2228.24s)
messenger they were constantly making
[37:09] (2229.84s)
improvements and it would always be a
[37:11] (2231.52s)
challenge of how do we now stay up to
[37:13] (2233.36s)
date and so the main project I I worked
[37:15] (2235.84s)
on was moving the core infrastructure
[37:19] (2239.12s)
back into what messenger had already
[37:21] (2241.44s)
developed. So migrating the old infra to
[37:24] (2244.48s)
the new infra while maintaining
[37:25] (2245.92s)
compatibility with all the custom
[37:27] (2247.36s)
features that portal had and adopting a
[37:30] (2250.08s)
lot of the new features that the RTC
[37:31] (2251.92s)
infra had enabled for us. So like kind
[37:34] (2254.16s)
of navigating that at a product layer
[37:36] (2256.08s)
and also the tech layer that was the
[37:38] (2258.64s)
main project. I think one thing I tell
[37:40] (2260.96s)
people is at the staff level you can
[37:42] (2262.80s)
have one big project. I think some
[37:44] (2264.40s)
people have that, but for me I think
[37:45] (2265.92s)
having a portfolio approach worked out
[37:47] (2267.44s)
really well. But that was like the main
[37:48] (2268.80s)
thing that was really crossunctional and
[37:50] (2270.88s)
frankly a lot of like bureaucracy where
[37:53] (2273.12s)
it was managing people from the
[37:55] (2275.04s)
messenger team, managing people from
[37:56] (2276.32s)
portal leadership like getting everyone
[37:58] (2278.24s)
in line, PMs and so I think the other
[38:00] (2280.32s)
project that I mentioned earlier which
[38:02] (2282.00s)
was a debug tool that was purely
[38:03] (2283.76s)
engineering driven. I knew exactly who I
[38:05] (2285.84s)
was building for which was me and other
[38:07] (2287.52s)
engineers on the team. I think the
[38:09] (2289.12s)
combination of those two led to a pretty
[38:11] (2291.84s)
clear promo case when I was able to go
[38:14] (2294.72s)
up for it. It sounds clearly like IC6
[38:16] (2296.96s)
scope. You're you had to influence
[38:18] (2298.80s)
across teams. Sounds like a pretty big
[38:21] (2301.12s)
shared infrastructure initiative. I've
[38:23] (2303.92s)
heard a lot of other people getting IC6
[38:25] (2305.92s)
promos off of shared infra because that
[38:28] (2308.80s)
central team probably made it so much
[38:31] (2311.12s)
better in the interim when you were
[38:32] (2312.88s)
branched away. So when you merge
[38:34] (2314.40s)
together, it's almost like you unlocked
[38:37] (2317.12s)
all of their engineers's work in this
[38:40] (2320.16s)
new product surface. So were you
[38:42] (2322.08s)
intentional about your growth to IC6?
[38:43] (2323.92s)
Like was that something you you kept
[38:45] (2325.52s)
talking to your manager about? You said,
[38:46] (2326.88s)
"Hey, I want to get there or it just
[38:48] (2328.88s)
happened naturally?" Yeah, I mean I
[38:50] (2330.24s)
think the way you phrased the promotion
[38:52] (2332.00s)
conversation matters a lot. So like I
[38:53] (2333.92s)
think for the first year at Facebook, my
[38:56] (2336.08s)
goal was really is let me make sure I do
[38:57] (2337.92s)
well, right? Because I think a big
[38:58] (2338.96s)
turnoff and I learned this when I was on
[39:01] (2341.60s)
the other side as a manager later on,
[39:03] (2343.68s)
but like if you have someone who just
[39:05] (2345.28s)
joined the company and they're
[39:06] (2346.48s)
immediately asking you, okay, like I
[39:08] (2348.48s)
want to get promoted, can you help me?
[39:10] (2350.08s)
Right? It's a big turnoff because even
[39:11] (2351.92s)
especially for someone like me who
[39:14] (2354.44s)
had felt some level of imposter syndrome
[39:18] (2358.48s)
of like, hey, I came in at a fairly high
[39:20] (2360.24s)
level. There's a lot of expectation. My
[39:22] (2362.08s)
first priority for the first year was
[39:24] (2364.08s)
really let me just nail it. let me make
[39:25] (2365.76s)
sure that I'm exceeding expectation or
[39:28] (2368.64s)
at least meeting expectation for E5 or
[39:31] (2371.36s)
IC5 senior level before I think about
[39:34] (2374.08s)
promotion. So after that year and I felt
[39:35] (2375.92s)
like I now had developed some trust and
[39:38] (2378.08s)
I landed some good work then I started
[39:40] (2380.24s)
to have a really clear conversation with
[39:41] (2381.92s)
a manager about what does it look like
[39:44] (2384.64s)
to grow on the IC ladder? What does
[39:47] (2387.20s)
management look like? Because even back
[39:48] (2388.40s)
then I think there was some element of I
[39:50] (2390.40s)
enjoyed talking to people. I enjoyed
[39:52] (2392.72s)
mentoring people. So there was even
[39:54] (2394.56s)
discussion back then on what would it
[39:56] (2396.40s)
look like to be a manager. I think the
[39:57] (2397.84s)
conclusion we came to and I think it was
[39:59] (2399.20s)
the right one was let me first go up the
[40:00] (2400.96s)
ladder as a IC like an individual
[40:02] (2402.96s)
contributor and then maybe later on try
[40:04] (2404.96s)
out the management path which is what
[40:06] (2406.64s)
happened but it was a pretty like
[40:08] (2408.40s)
thought through deliberate conversation.
[40:10] (2410.56s)
You mentioned that there were two kind
[40:12] (2412.16s)
of big efforts that helped you get
[40:13] (2413.92s)
promoted. One of them was the the
[40:15] (2415.84s)
tooling that you made which sounds like
[40:18] (2418.00s)
that was a bottoms up initiative. You
[40:20] (2420.24s)
knew it was bad. Yeah, you saw how many
[40:22] (2422.64s)
people it could help and you just went
[40:24] (2424.16s)
and built it. For the the other the
[40:26] (2426.16s)
shared infrastructure initiative, did
[40:28] (2428.08s)
you create that scope or was that
[40:29] (2429.68s)
something that maybe your manager came
[40:31] (2431.84s)
to you and said, "Hey, we got to do
[40:33] (2433.92s)
this. Could you lead it?" How did you
[40:36] (2436.16s)
get that opportunity? Yeah, that one was
[40:37] (2437.92s)
more of like a it it was kind of obvious
[40:40] (2440.32s)
that that had to be done by someone. And
[40:42] (2442.56s)
I think I had been around the team long
[40:44] (2444.64s)
enough and I had enough of a seniority
[40:46] (2446.72s)
and relationship with the RTC team, like
[40:49] (2449.04s)
the messenger team, to make it happen.
[40:51] (2451.28s)
So it kind of felt like a natural fit of
[40:54] (2454.24s)
okay, I can just step up and and do it
[40:56] (2456.80s)
rather than it being something like I'm
[40:58] (2458.56s)
going to create scope. It definitely was
[41:00] (2460.64s)
like a obvious thing that both the RTC
[41:02] (2462.88s)
team wanted and the portal team wanted.
[41:04] (2464.32s)
It was a question of who could step up
[41:06] (2466.96s)
and try and be the point person for this
[41:09] (2469.20s)
initiative. Got it. And you were
[41:10] (2470.64s)
naturally that person because you had
[41:12] (2472.32s)
been delivering. You had all the
[41:14] (2474.16s)
relationships and you'd been there for
[41:15] (2475.68s)
long enough. Is that right? That's
[41:16] (2476.88s)
right. Yeah. Yeah. I think it was kind
[41:18] (2478.08s)
of very clear to everyone that if I
[41:20] (2480.56s)
wanted it, I would probably be one of
[41:22] (2482.16s)
the better people to take this on or
[41:23] (2483.76s)
maybe the best person to take it on just
[41:25] (2485.04s)
because I had been around long enough
[41:26] (2486.08s)
and I had I knew the context of what
[41:28] (2488.64s)
each team was trying to do and how to
[41:30] (2490.56s)
make it kind of compatible, how to make
[41:32] (2492.00s)
it work together. Okay. And so you you
[41:33] (2493.76s)
talked a little bit about management and
[41:35] (2495.20s)
I know you got the IC6 promo and then
[41:37] (2497.76s)
later you switched to TLM and I was kind
[41:40] (2500.80s)
of curious. I think a lot of people want
[41:43] (2503.20s)
to make that same decision for their
[41:45] (2505.12s)
their careers. So what was your
[41:47] (2507.12s)
reasoning for wanting to switch? I mean
[41:49] (2509.12s)
I do think genuinely the whole point of
[41:51] (2511.12s)
like my company now is to try and help
[41:53] (2513.12s)
people. So I think manage good managers
[41:54] (2514.88s)
I think genuinely have a desire to help
[41:56] (2516.56s)
people like they want to see people grow
[41:58] (2518.56s)
and then I think as a byproduct of
[42:00] (2520.24s)
helping people grow you also can
[42:01] (2521.52s)
actually have a lot of impact managers
[42:03] (2523.60s)
are generally quite senior and respected
[42:06] (2526.32s)
at at most companies right so I that was
[42:08] (2528.88s)
the initial motivation and again going
[42:10] (2530.88s)
back to the idea of like I had a lot of
[42:12] (2532.32s)
context I knew a lot of people so again
[42:14] (2534.72s)
felt like a kind of a natural transition
[42:16] (2536.48s)
in some sense like you have a growing
[42:18] (2538.40s)
team and you want someone to give them
[42:20] (2540.80s)
feedback and make sure they're working
[42:21] (2541.92s)
high impact stuff okay, do you want to
[42:23] (2543.44s)
become a manager? And so it was a very
[42:25] (2545.12s)
it again it didn't feel forced at all.
[42:27] (2547.12s)
It kind of felt like oh a very natural
[42:28] (2548.64s)
like is something you've expressed
[42:30] (2550.56s)
interest in in the past and also this
[42:32] (2552.72s)
seems to be a natural fit here or the
[42:34] (2554.56s)
organization needs it. Do you want to
[42:35] (2555.92s)
try out management? Right. So let's say
[42:38] (2558.00s)
someone's decided for themselves they
[42:39] (2559.76s)
they definitely want to try management.
[42:42] (2562.72s)
What are what are those concrete steps
[42:44] (2564.64s)
that maybe you took for instance that
[42:46] (2566.72s)
got you to actually become a manager?
[42:49] (2569.68s)
Yeah, I think a couple things. One is
[42:51] (2571.12s)
just ask ask yourself the question of do
[42:53] (2573.68s)
you enjoy helping people? Do you enjoy
[42:55] (2575.92s)
working with people? Like if you hate
[42:57] (2577.04s)
one-on-one, do you dread the one-on-one
[42:58] (2578.56s)
with your manager or one-on- ones with
[43:00] (2580.40s)
other people? You're going to have a
[43:02] (2582.08s)
really difficult time thriving as a
[43:04] (2584.32s)
manager because a lot of your time is
[43:05] (2585.52s)
going to be one-on- ones or even just
[43:06] (2586.96s)
like ping like reacting to pings. And I
[43:10] (2590.00s)
do think one of the hard parts about
[43:11] (2591.36s)
management is that you become more of a
[43:13] (2593.44s)
firefighter or you become more reactive
[43:15] (2595.76s)
rather than proactive. Like you can't
[43:17] (2597.04s)
guard your time as much. So the step one
[43:19] (2599.20s)
is like are you willing to do you like
[43:21] (2601.36s)
people enough and do you want to help
[43:22] (2602.48s)
people enough that you're willing to
[43:23] (2603.44s)
give up some of the autonomy or
[43:25] (2605.44s)
flexibility that you might have had as
[43:26] (2606.80s)
an engineer. If you've clarified that
[43:28] (2608.24s)
with yourself and by the way you should
[43:30] (2610.08s)
test that too like don't just like
[43:31] (2611.60s)
intellectualize it. I think it's worth
[43:33] (2613.76s)
actually having one-on- ones with people
[43:35] (2615.36s)
and like start doing some of that motion
[43:37] (2617.20s)
now even as I see if you think you might
[43:39] (2619.60s)
want to become a manager. Another big
[43:41] (2621.28s)
part of management honestly is having
[43:42] (2622.72s)
opinions. You should have opinions not
[43:44] (2624.88s)
only about the fe feedback of like what
[43:47] (2627.04s)
quality of work people are doing on the
[43:48] (2628.56s)
team and like how they could do better.
[43:50] (2630.08s)
That's one part of the having opinions.
[43:52] (2632.00s)
Another part about having opinions is
[43:54] (2634.08s)
how should the team and organization
[43:56] (2636.72s)
change based on different priorities of
[43:59] (2639.60s)
the company or of of the or if you feel
[44:02] (2642.24s)
like you haven't done that reflection or
[44:03] (2643.76s)
if you don't want to do that reflection,
[44:05] (2645.52s)
I actually don't think management is
[44:06] (2646.96s)
again like it's not a good fit in the
[44:08] (2648.96s)
sense that you wouldn't do well. I think
[44:10] (2650.56s)
the best managers are the ones who come
[44:12] (2652.32s)
in with a very strong point of view and
[44:14] (2654.40s)
they're able to effectively bend the
[44:16] (2656.40s)
organization to help them achieve what
[44:18] (2658.80s)
they want. And so I think the
[44:20] (2660.24s)
combination of those two like do you
[44:22] (2662.08s)
number one enjoy helping people and like
[44:23] (2663.60s)
testing out testing it out with one-on
[44:26] (2666.16s)
ones and like meeting leading meetings
[44:28] (2668.56s)
and things like that and then number two
[44:30] (2670.40s)
do you care and do you want to be part
[44:32] (2672.88s)
of like those kind of broader
[44:34] (2674.56s)
organizational decisions around what the
[44:36] (2676.88s)
team or what the org should do? I see.
[44:38] (2678.56s)
And when you say have an opinion, okay,
[44:40] (2680.24s)
I'm thinking from the IC perspective. So
[44:42] (2682.16s)
for someone to kind of get a sense of if
[44:44] (2684.72s)
they like that kind of work, it sounds
[44:46] (2686.88s)
more of like the directional work and
[44:49] (2689.04s)
the kind of like tech leadership work is
[44:51] (2691.52s)
the best simulation of that. Is that
[44:53] (2693.52s)
right? Yeah, that's right. I mean, I
[44:54] (2694.80s)
think even a senior a very senior IC
[44:57] (2697.20s)
effectively becomes part of the
[44:58] (2698.56s)
expectation is that you should have very
[45:00] (2700.64s)
clear opinions that you can articulate
[45:02] (2702.64s)
and convince people of about what the
[45:04] (2704.32s)
team should be doing for the next six
[45:05] (2705.60s)
months or next one year. And if you feel
[45:07] (2707.76s)
like you would really rather not have
[45:09] (2709.52s)
those kind of negotiations with other
[45:11] (2711.52s)
teams or other people about what the
[45:12] (2712.96s)
team should do and you just want to be
[45:14] (2714.16s)
more of like a I want to just execute
[45:16] (2716.32s)
and write code and like feel productive
[45:18] (2718.48s)
then I think management again is like
[45:19] (2719.92s)
not a good fit. That was actually one of
[45:21] (2721.68s)
the big challenges for me which is like
[45:24] (2724.40s)
when I became a TLM. TLM in particular
[45:26] (2726.40s)
is difficult because like you're kind of
[45:27] (2727.68s)
straddling the line between doing IC
[45:29] (2729.68s)
work and management work but I remember
[45:33] (2733.12s)
feeling a lot of the time where at the
[45:35] (2735.60s)
end of my day I was like what did I
[45:36] (2736.80s)
actually achieve today? And really the
[45:40] (2740.24s)
way I spent my time was in meetings
[45:42] (2742.24s)
doing one-on ones trying to figure out
[45:44] (2744.08s)
the road mapap for something. And if you
[45:46] (2746.72s)
are approaching your job with the
[45:49] (2749.28s)
mindset of let me just crank out code
[45:51] (2751.76s)
and let me ship an experiment then you
[45:55] (2755.12s)
might not be satisfied with how your day
[45:57] (2757.28s)
or week is going if you don't do any of
[45:59] (2759.52s)
that stuff. Was there anything that
[46:00] (2760.80s)
surprised you when you switched to
[46:02] (2762.32s)
management? I mean so I think in my case
[46:04] (2764.08s)
in particular because I was a tech
[46:05] (2765.28s)
league manager or was like a hybrid
[46:07] (2767.04s)
role. I think that job was tough because
[46:09] (2769.76s)
it's okay to be a TLM as a transitory
[46:12] (2772.08s)
role where like you're deciding whether
[46:13] (2773.68s)
you want to be a full-time manager like
[46:15] (2775.12s)
a full-time M1 or M2 or you want to be a
[46:17] (2777.44s)
full-time IC, but it's not a good place
[46:20] (2780.72s)
to be in terms of long-term
[46:23] (2783.44s)
sustainability because like you kind of
[46:26] (2786.32s)
are not really clear about are you being
[46:29] (2789.60s)
judged or evaluated on your IC work and
[46:32] (2792.40s)
your ability to strip a lot of
[46:34] (2794.32s)
interesting code or are you being
[46:35] (2795.92s)
evaluated primarily on for people
[46:38] (2798.24s)
leadership, right? And so that was
[46:40] (2800.00s)
difficult for me. I I think I I was
[46:42] (2802.40s)
surprised how taxing
[46:44] (2804.88s)
that would be. Yeah. Um Yeah. And I
[46:48] (2808.00s)
ended up switching teams like after
[46:49] (2809.44s)
that. Oh, interesting. Yeah. I I I
[46:52] (2812.32s)
switched to TLM too, kind of in a trans
[46:54] (2814.88s)
transitory state to EM. And I asked a
[46:58] (2818.16s)
lot of people before I switched, you
[46:59] (2819.76s)
know, what they thought. I talked to
[47:01] (2821.68s)
other TLMs and every single TLM I talked
[47:04] (2824.96s)
to told me, hey, it's not a good idea to
[47:08] (2828.96s)
to stay long-term. I have not heard one
[47:11] (2831.44s)
person tell me that, hey, you should
[47:13] (2833.60s)
become a TLM and it's a great idea in
[47:15] (2835.44s)
the future because you kind of just
[47:17] (2837.04s)
become this, you know, jack of all
[47:19] (2839.60s)
trades, master of none. You're not
[47:22] (2842.00s)
specialized and growing long-term in one
[47:24] (2844.48s)
of the two paths. And also, it's like
[47:26] (2846.88s)
unsustainable to try to do two jobs at
[47:29] (2849.20s)
the same time at this point. Okay. You
[47:30] (2850.80s)
got to staff TLM, you switched teams,
[47:33] (2853.76s)
and after you switched teams, you you
[47:35] (2855.60s)
ended up leaving Meta. You left Meta to
[47:37] (2857.60s)
start your own company. I'm kind of
[47:38] (2858.80s)
curious about the the story behind that.
[47:41] (2861.44s)
What what made you want to leave Meta
[47:43] (2863.12s)
and how did that happen? Yeah, I mean I
[47:44] (2864.64s)
think like I mentioned before like I
[47:46] (2866.24s)
think as tempered there's like in the
[47:47] (2867.68s)
water somewhere there's like this kind
[47:49] (2869.68s)
of like everyone thinks about starting a
[47:51] (2871.36s)
company or talks about starting a
[47:52] (2872.48s)
company and so I had definitely fallen
[47:55] (2875.68s)
into that and it just in my mind
[47:58] (2878.32s)
starting from like I would say 20 2016
[48:00] (2880.72s)
like fairly early on I always had this
[48:03] (2883.28s)
idea like okay I'm I want to do a
[48:04] (2884.80s)
company just a question of when. Yeah.
[48:06] (2886.96s)
And I finally felt like I was ready for
[48:09] (2889.44s)
it at Meta for a couple of reasons.
[48:11] (2891.60s)
Number one, probably the biggest reason
[48:12] (2892.88s)
is I felt like I found a co-founder who
[48:14] (2894.64s)
I wanted to try and explore an idea
[48:16] (2896.16s)
with. I trusted them. I enjoyed working
[48:17] (2897.76s)
with them and that was a huge unlock is
[48:20] (2900.96s)
I I finally find someone found someone
[48:22] (2902.72s)
who we have validated our relationship
[48:25] (2905.44s)
and we like working with each other and
[48:27] (2907.04s)
we have similar timelines. I think the
[48:29] (2909.12s)
second thing was I felt like I had
[48:30] (2910.96s)
reached a level in my career where I
[48:33] (2913.60s)
felt satisfied or maybe the maybe
[48:36] (2916.40s)
negative framing of it could be like I
[48:38] (2918.64s)
felt like I had plateaued so it's okay.
[48:41] (2921.12s)
made it and now like it's harder to see
[48:43] (2923.36s)
a pathway to like a director or like
[48:45] (2925.20s)
something very senior. So now is a good
[48:48] (2928.16s)
time just to leave. And I I mean I also
[48:50] (2930.64s)
felt like I mean you get well paid as an
[48:52] (2932.56s)
engineer in general and I think I got
[48:53] (2933.84s)
lucky through a combination of promotion
[48:56] (2936.24s)
and just stop growth at Meta that I felt
[48:59] (2939.44s)
like I didn't have to work for a few
[49:00] (2940.72s)
years. So that was obviously important
[49:02] (2942.40s)
in terms of optionality like I didn't
[49:03] (2943.92s)
have to worry about finances. I could
[49:05] (2945.60s)
cover my life for a couple years. And I
[49:08] (2948.00s)
think the third and final thing was like
[49:09] (2949.28s)
I call I had some signal of like I had
[49:11] (2951.84s)
been doing tutorials about Android
[49:13] (2953.76s)
actually at that point. I've been
[49:15] (2955.52s)
publishing them on YouTube for a few
[49:17] (2957.20s)
years starting in 2019. So I go like
[49:20] (2960.88s)
that was another input. But there seems
[49:23] (2963.36s)
to be something here. I enjoy teaching.
[49:25] (2965.28s)
I enjoy working with developers. Can we
[49:27] (2967.20s)
build something on it? Can we see what
[49:28] (2968.64s)
happens? So the combination of all three
[49:30] (2970.24s)
of those led me to feel confident about
[49:32] (2972.88s)
leaving. you had already built up that
[49:34] (2974.72s)
base of skills, money, a much stronger
[49:38] (2978.16s)
foundation to start a company off of.
[49:39] (2979.92s)
You know, co-founder is a big part of
[49:41] (2981.36s)
the equation. Where did you find your
[49:42] (2982.72s)
co-founder? Alex and I worked together
[49:44] (2984.40s)
on Portal in 2017. When I first joined
[49:46] (2986.64s)
the company, he was literally in the
[49:48] (2988.32s)
same exact team with me. He ended up
[49:49] (2989.76s)
switching actually relatively quickly,
[49:51] (2991.44s)
but he we worked together pretty closely
[49:52] (2992.96s)
for like a few months and then we stayed
[49:54] (2994.88s)
in touch when he moved over to
[49:56] (2996.40s)
Instagram. So, we probably met every
[49:58] (2998.48s)
week in person at Facebook pre-COVID and
[50:01] (3001.52s)
then once COVID happened, we started
[50:03] (3003.04s)
talking like almost every other day.
[50:04] (3004.96s)
Wow. Just like talking about different
[50:06] (3006.48s)
ideas and different things we want to
[50:08] (3008.32s)
try out together. When you ended up
[50:09] (3009.84s)
quitting, did you already have something
[50:11] (3011.92s)
built? Yeah, we had nothing built. I
[50:13] (3013.68s)
mean, I think what we had done before we
[50:15] (3015.12s)
quit was we had commit we had commitment
[50:17] (3017.04s)
to each other that we would work on it
[50:18] (3018.24s)
for at least, you know, 6 months or a
[50:20] (3020.16s)
year. The second commitment we had to
[50:21] (3021.60s)
each other was that we knew kind of the
[50:23] (3023.36s)
broad domain area that we wanted to
[50:24] (3024.88s)
operate in because a big part of that
[50:26] (3026.40s)
was what we've been doing for maybe like
[50:28] (3028.32s)
six months prior to us quitting is we
[50:30] (3030.16s)
were just doing community building and
[50:31] (3031.68s)
like research like during co we ran
[50:34] (3034.16s)
these free webinars talking about
[50:36] (3036.32s)
different elements of career growth and
[50:37] (3037.76s)
those actually did quite well like I
[50:39] (3039.20s)
think part of it was just like people
[50:40] (3040.72s)
were really itching for interaction
[50:43] (3043.04s)
social interaction at home and so we had
[50:45] (3045.12s)
these webinars of like literally 800
[50:46] (3046.80s)
people who joined it was a huge number
[50:48] (3048.16s)
of people who just joined to hear us
[50:49] (3049.60s)
talk about different elements of career
[50:51] (3051.28s)
growth. And so we felt like, okay, we
[50:53] (3053.12s)
are committed to this broad domain.
[50:54] (3054.80s)
We're committed to working on it for a
[50:55] (3055.92s)
certain amount of time. And we had this
[50:58] (3058.80s)
ambition of like, let's figure out how
[51:00] (3060.56s)
we can get funding or at least build
[51:03] (3063.92s)
something once we quit. That was that
[51:05] (3065.68s)
was the idea. I see. And so you guys
[51:07] (3067.60s)
ended up applying to YC and getting
[51:09] (3069.52s)
fundraising through that avenue. Is that
[51:11] (3071.52s)
something you'd recommend to, let's say,
[51:13] (3073.28s)
I'm a big tech employee thinking about
[51:16] (3076.16s)
starting a company. Is YFC the best way
[51:18] (3078.88s)
to get fundraising or is there more
[51:21] (3081.52s)
behind that decision? It depends. Like
[51:23] (3083.36s)
when you say start a company, it's kind
[51:24] (3084.56s)
of like what we talked about earlier
[51:25] (3085.44s)
with acquisition. Acquisition is such an
[51:27] (3087.28s)
overloaded term. Start a company is also
[51:29] (3089.44s)
a very overloaded term, right? You could
[51:31] (3091.12s)
start a company which is like I'm going
[51:32] (3092.56s)
to build utility apps on Android which
[51:34] (3094.72s)
just get a million downloads and then
[51:36] (3096.32s)
you make no money, right? Or you could
[51:38] (3098.32s)
build small apps on on your phone which
[51:41] (3101.12s)
make like 5K a month. That's a pretty
[51:42] (3102.96s)
cool thing. Or you could just cover your
[51:44] (3104.64s)
living expenses. or you could try and
[51:46] (3106.40s)
make like a billion dollar company,
[51:48] (3108.32s)
right? And so if you are in that latter
[51:50] (3110.08s)
category where you have some ambition to
[51:51] (3111.92s)
make a huge company, then I think yeah,
[51:53] (3113.52s)
YC makes sense as like a funding
[51:56] (3116.16s)
vehicle, I do think that it depends on
[51:58] (3118.72s)
like your network. If you're a
[52:00] (3120.24s)
first-time founder and you don't have
[52:01] (3121.36s)
that much of a network, then YC is a
[52:02] (3122.72s)
no-brainer. Like it's such an obvious
[52:04] (3124.64s)
decision that you'll get credibility,
[52:06] (3126.72s)
you that money, you get the
[52:08] (3128.24s)
accountability of YC. But if you're a
[52:11] (3131.04s)
repeat founder or if you already have a
[52:13] (3133.76s)
network of other VCs like you already
[52:15] (3135.76s)
know some of the top tier VC firm then
[52:18] (3138.16s)
maybe you can make the argument that you
[52:19] (3139.60s)
know YC is not worth it. So comparing
[52:22] (3142.24s)
and so now you've been working on your
[52:24] (3144.00s)
startup for some time now. What do you
[52:25] (3145.76s)
see are the biggest differences between
[52:28] (3148.00s)
the startup and that you're running for
[52:29] (3149.92s)
yourself and and big tech? Oh there's so
[52:32] (3152.56s)
many differences. I mean good and bad. I
[52:34] (3154.64s)
mean I think one of the big changes
[52:36] (3156.56s)
which is both good and bad is like I
[52:38] (3158.16s)
think the structure accountability is
[52:40] (3160.08s)
like you are in charge of it right
[52:42] (3162.08s)
there's no boss there's no deadline me
[52:44] (3164.80s)
Alex and we're a team of three so we're
[52:46] (3166.32s)
still actually quite small we're three
[52:48] (3168.16s)
full-time people and so we try to
[52:50] (3170.80s)
manufacture urgency we try and
[52:53] (3173.04s)
manufacture deadlines but unlike a
[52:55] (3175.60s)
company like Facebook or Pinterest or
[52:57] (3177.92s)
any other company really where almost
[53:00] (3180.00s)
always you have like a cadence of a
[53:02] (3182.16s)
quarterly release or some like big
[53:03] (3183.84s)
launch coming up that you have that
[53:06] (3186.00s)
going for you. You are in charge of
[53:08] (3188.32s)
creating that structure for yourself
[53:10] (3190.48s)
when you are doing a startup, right?
[53:12] (3192.24s)
There's no manager, there's no boss,
[53:13] (3193.68s)
there's no one looking out for you. So
[53:15] (3195.84s)
that is both empowering and also very
[53:18] (3198.64s)
scary like you have to work with urgency
[53:20] (3200.72s)
otherwise you could spend five years you
[53:24] (3204.00s)
know just like twiddling your thumbs and
[53:26] (3206.56s)
that's not a good outcome. So that's one
[53:28] (3208.56s)
big change. I also think that there's
[53:31] (3211.12s)
kind of related there's a lot more
[53:32] (3212.40s)
ambiguity what to build like even now I
[53:34] (3214.40s)
I feel like it took us a while to get to
[53:36] (3216.16s)
where Taro is now. Initially the idea
[53:38] (3218.40s)
was just focused on let's build
[53:39] (3219.92s)
something for developers and we thought
[53:41] (3221.20s)
a dev tool could work like something in
[53:43] (3223.36s)
I don't know reviewing code writing code
[53:44] (3224.80s)
things like that but then we felt like
[53:46] (3226.80s)
the community angle was more powerful so
[53:49] (3229.04s)
we started going more into community and
[53:50] (3230.56s)
that ended up going into courses and now
[53:52] (3232.16s)
we have like this pretty robust course
[53:53] (3233.92s)
platform along with some community
[53:55] (3235.44s)
elements that product management
[53:57] (3237.12s)
thinking is something that a lot of big
[53:58] (3238.80s)
tech engineers in particular have no
[54:00] (3240.72s)
idea how to do like talking to users
[54:03] (3243.36s)
iterating on the feedback looking at
[54:04] (3244.96s)
data you have to be willing to just dive
[54:06] (3246.72s)
into a new area and like learn something
[54:08] (3248.48s)
a lot more obviously when you're a two
[54:10] (3250.48s)
person threeperson company compared to
[54:12] (3252.08s)
when you have a worldass data scientist
[54:14] (3254.96s)
or UXR person or you know whoever else
[54:17] (3257.84s)
sitting next to you. Let's say you were
[54:19] (3259.92s)
I guess giving advice to people who are
[54:21] (3261.84s)
in big tech and they're they're kind of
[54:23] (3263.36s)
thinking about it. At what point do you
[54:25] (3265.84s)
think you would advise someone it could
[54:28] (3268.64s)
make sense to start a company? I mean I
[54:30] (3270.64s)
think this depends a lot on what you
[54:32] (3272.96s)
define as success, right? So, here's the
[54:35] (3275.36s)
thing. Like, you can have a very, very
[54:37] (3277.20s)
amazing life if you just stick around
[54:38] (3278.88s)
and you climb the ladder and you get to
[54:41] (3281.20s)
like director or higher at Meta. Like,
[54:44] (3284.48s)
that's an amazing amazing life and
[54:46] (3286.40s)
you're in the top 0.1% of the people in
[54:48] (3288.08s)
the world. But I think if you want to
[54:50] (3290.32s)
have a lot more control and autonomy
[54:52] (3292.80s)
over what you do and what you build, and
[54:54] (3294.96s)
you also want an outlier outcome,
[54:56] (3296.56s)
outlier meaning like you want to have a
[54:58] (3298.80s)
small small chance of a huge outcome.
[55:01] (3301.60s)
It's actually very hard to have that
[55:04] (3304.64s)
happen in a big tech company because
[55:06] (3306.88s)
like a big tech company, I mean, I could
[55:09] (3309.12s)
be proven wrong, but I don't think Meta
[55:10] (3310.80s)
is going to like 5x in value in the next
[55:13] (3313.44s)
5 years, right? It might double, which
[55:15] (3315.36s)
would be amazing, but it's probably not
[55:16] (3316.72s)
going to 5x or 10x. And so, if you want
[55:19] (3319.20s)
to have something which is 10xing in
[55:20] (3320.72s)
value, then I think that could be like a
[55:22] (3322.16s)
time. So, like I would say like when you
[55:23] (3323.52s)
have the stability, this foundation
[55:24] (3324.96s)
laid, that's how I think about it. like
[55:27] (3327.04s)
you've worked in big tech, you have the
[55:28] (3328.32s)
credibility, you have the finances. Now,
[55:29] (3329.92s)
now you can go for a bigger swing, then
[55:32] (3332.24s)
that could be one input into doing a
[55:35] (3335.44s)
startup. And the other thing is what we
[55:36] (3336.88s)
mentioned before, which is like you have
[55:38] (3338.80s)
to really get along with your
[55:40] (3340.24s)
co-founder. It's like a marriage. And so
[55:42] (3342.80s)
if you find someone who you really feel
[55:45] (3345.12s)
like you get along with and critically
[55:46] (3346.96s)
the timing works out because that's the
[55:48] (3348.32s)
other thing I noticed is that sometimes
[55:50] (3350.00s)
people have the their dream co-founder
[55:52] (3352.32s)
in mind and they're kind of just waiting
[55:54] (3354.00s)
and they're never on the same timeline
[55:56] (3356.64s)
where it's like oh one person is waiting
[55:58] (3358.16s)
for a bonus or a vesting period. So
[56:00] (3360.16s)
they're going to wait for six more
[56:01] (3361.20s)
months and the other person when they
[56:02] (3362.24s)
wait six more months they have a kid and
[56:03] (3363.76s)
now oh now my kid is like I'm going to
[56:05] (3365.36s)
wait until they're in daycare. they wait
[56:07] (3367.36s)
two more years or whatever and then the
[56:08] (3368.96s)
other person in two more years they're
[56:10] (3370.40s)
now like oh I have to get married. It's
[56:12] (3372.24s)
like having the alignment on the
[56:14] (3374.40s)
timeline and like your commitment to how
[56:16] (3376.32s)
long you want to do the startup that is
[56:17] (3377.84s)
you dare to find as well. Yeah. I had a
[56:20] (3380.96s)
I had a friend who was at Meta and then
[56:23] (3383.44s)
he left to go do his own company and I
[56:25] (3385.28s)
asked him his motive and he said he felt
[56:28] (3388.00s)
like he would regret if he looked back
[56:30] (3390.16s)
on his life and he had did that big tech
[56:32] (3392.72s)
trajectory the whole time. he would just
[56:35] (3395.20s)
regret that he didn't have a a story
[56:38] (3398.08s)
worth telling. So yeah, there's so many
[56:40] (3400.48s)
different ways to look at it. I think
[56:42] (3402.24s)
the last things I want to ask a little
[56:43] (3403.92s)
bit about I guess reflecting over
[56:46] (3406.00s)
everything looking back on all the
[56:47] (3407.68s)
different legs you had a little bit of
[56:49] (3409.36s)
startup big tech a few legs of big tech
[56:52] (3412.32s)
and now you're back in startup but as a
[56:54] (3414.56s)
founder rather than engineer what period
[56:56] (3416.96s)
of your career did you feel like you had
[56:59] (3419.12s)
the most skill growth or or career
[57:01] (3421.60s)
growth? I would say when I found that
[57:03] (3423.68s)
really amazing mentor at Pinterest, that
[57:05] (3425.52s)
was one period of dramatic growth where
[57:07] (3427.44s)
I was like pair programming and finding
[57:08] (3428.88s)
this person and like it's there are a
[57:11] (3431.28s)
lot of things you learn by osmosis that
[57:12] (3432.72s)
you don't get taught but just like
[57:14] (3434.32s)
seeing how he operated and made this
[57:15] (3435.84s)
separate mini app that we talked about
[57:17] (3437.28s)
that was like eye opening for me like
[57:19] (3439.04s)
you are empowered to change your
[57:20] (3440.56s)
environment and do things that was
[57:21] (3441.92s)
powerful I think at Meta when I started
[57:23] (3443.92s)
or Facebook before when I was there when
[57:26] (3446.48s)
I was actually meeting a team and doing
[57:28] (3448.64s)
this migration that was powerful and
[57:30] (3450.80s)
along with that the um debug tool, this
[57:33] (3453.60s)
like tooling change I made, that was the
[57:36] (3456.40s)
first time I felt like I built
[57:38] (3458.48s)
something, especially in the big tech
[57:40] (3460.08s)
environment where like I was creating
[57:42] (3462.08s)
value. Like I felt like I was creating
[57:43] (3463.36s)
value for the first time, which is kind
[57:45] (3465.04s)
of odd to say, but I felt like a lot of
[57:47] (3467.60s)
the other things I had done, I felt like
[57:49] (3469.20s)
a worker be, right? You know, like I
[57:51] (3471.20s)
felt like, okay, this is like something
[57:53] (3473.92s)
which is being sent up, sent down from
[57:56] (3476.08s)
above. I'm going to be like a good
[57:58] (3478.08s)
Android developer or I'm going to be a
[57:59] (3479.52s)
good you know recommendation system
[58:01] (3481.84s)
engineer and just like do it and for the
[58:04] (3484.64s)
first time I felt like I an idea that I
[58:07] (3487.68s)
had come up with like it was my baby and
[58:10] (3490.00s)
I was able to actually put out in the
[58:11] (3491.68s)
world and people were willing to adopt
[58:13] (3493.76s)
it like that was I think a crazy eye
[58:17] (3497.04s)
openener again for me which probably led
[58:18] (3498.96s)
to like why I felt confident also doing
[58:20] (3500.80s)
a startup and maybe the third thing I
[58:22] (3502.80s)
would say which is not really maybe
[58:24] (3504.00s)
relevant to a big tech audience but I
[58:25] (3505.60s)
felt like the two months or three months
[58:27] (3507.36s)
of YC when we were doing like the actual
[58:29] (3509.52s)
YC period where you had a group check-in
[58:31] (3511.60s)
every week and you talk to people every
[58:33] (3513.84s)
week about what you've done. That was
[58:35] (3515.60s)
also very intense. But I learned a lot
[58:37] (3517.36s)
in that process just cuz like if you
[58:39] (3519.68s)
don't perform like you're kind of being
[58:41] (3521.20s)
shamed and like you have this intense
[58:43] (3523.20s)
pressure to like get things done. And
[58:44] (3524.88s)
what about looking back? I think this is
[58:47] (3527.36s)
something people are always interested
[58:48] (3528.56s)
in is if you if you look at everything,
[58:52] (3532.56s)
is there anything that you regret or
[58:54] (3534.80s)
that other people could learn from where
[58:56] (3536.48s)
you think, man, I wish I changed that?
[58:58] (3538.72s)
And if so, what what would it be? That's
[59:00] (3540.48s)
a good question. I feel like the startup
[59:02] (3542.40s)
I joined in 2014, I think that I don't
[59:06] (3546.24s)
necessarily regret it because I think I
[59:08] (3548.64s)
learned a lot. I have a good story to
[59:10] (3550.40s)
tell from it. But if I'm if I'm looking
[59:12] (3552.08s)
back at the reason I did it, honestly,
[59:13] (3553.92s)
I'm not sure if it was the best decision
[59:16] (3556.08s)
because a lot of it was I maybe somewhat
[59:18] (3558.16s)
ego-driven of like I don't want to be
[59:20] (3560.56s)
one of many people in big tech. I want
[59:22] (3562.88s)
to do the special thing. I want to go do
[59:24] (3564.88s)
this thing which is unique to me. And it
[59:28] (3568.16s)
was unique to me. So that was true. Like
[59:29] (3569.52s)
I I think I felt special doing it. But
[59:31] (3571.12s)
at the same time, I feel like I don't
[59:33] (3573.12s)
know if I had enough maturity as an
[59:35] (3575.28s)
engineer to really handle this scenario.
[59:37] (3577.04s)
like I I did I think flounder or
[59:38] (3578.88s)
struggle a bit both at the startup and
[59:41] (3581.12s)
also when I joined Pinterest. So I think
[59:42] (3582.88s)
maybe going into a more structured
[59:44] (3584.16s)
environment would have maybe been a
[59:46] (3586.24s)
better bet for me in terms of my
[59:47] (3587.84s)
maturation as an engineer. So that's the
[59:49] (3589.52s)
one that comes to mind. But I think in
[59:50] (3590.80s)
general I I would say I don't really
[59:51] (3591.92s)
have that many regrets. Like I just feel
[59:54] (3594.32s)
again and again in my career I've been
[59:55] (3595.92s)
so lucky. Like it may that's weird to
[59:59] (3599.36s)
say or think about but like there have
[60:01] (3601.28s)
been so many jobs where I've been
[60:02] (3602.72s)
rejected for which honestly if I had
[60:05] (3605.52s)
gotten the offer I would have taken it
[60:07] (3607.20s)
and that company completely exploded
[60:09] (3609.40s)
like a year later. Which one? Um, and
[60:12] (3612.80s)
also even in the VC world, like there
[60:15] (3615.28s)
were a couple VC firms that strung us
[60:17] (3617.36s)
along so badly with Taro and they were
[60:20] (3620.64s)
like, "Oh, we'll invest in you at this
[60:22] (3622.64s)
valuation. We'll give you this amount of
[60:24] (3624.00s)
money." And it didn't work out. Like we
[60:26] (3626.48s)
we effectively got rejected and then I
[60:29] (3629.84s)
look back at like how Taro has
[60:31] (3631.20s)
progressed and what we've been able to
[60:32] (3632.40s)
do and what pressure we would have felt
[60:35] (3635.04s)
with those VC firms on our cap table.
[60:38] (3638.40s)
And again, I just feel so lucky. Like I
[60:40] (3640.56s)
feel like in this weird way I have
[60:42] (3642.96s)
failed my way into success. Like I just
[60:47] (3647.20s)
gotten so lucky again and again with um
[60:49] (3649.60s)
getting or not getting opportunities and
[60:51] (3651.28s)
that's led me to where I am today.
[60:52] (3652.40s)
Right. You know when people see a career
[60:53] (3653.92s)
like yours, they're going to say
[60:55] (3655.52s)
something like it was luck. I guess my
[60:57] (3657.60s)
question to you is what portion of your
[61:00] (3660.40s)
career growth do you think was luck? Oh,
[61:03] (3663.68s)
I think a lot of it was luck. I think I
[61:06] (3666.48s)
think yeah super lucky like um with the
[61:10] (3670.08s)
opportunities and the people I came
[61:11] (3671.36s)
across I will say like you can
[61:13] (3673.36s)
manufacture luck in the sense of being
[61:15] (3675.60s)
curious about the people and the
[61:16] (3676.80s)
opportunities around you. I think a lot
[61:18] (3678.32s)
of the ways I would been able to find my
[61:20] (3680.80s)
co-founder, find that startup in 2014,
[61:23] (3683.52s)
get the opportunities at Facebook is I
[61:25] (3685.44s)
think one thing I do a relatively good
[61:26] (3686.80s)
job of is keeping in touch with people.
[61:28] (3688.24s)
Like I try and just be friendly with,
[61:30] (3690.24s)
oh, you know, will you take that class
[61:31] (3691.60s)
together? What do what have you been up
[61:32] (3692.80s)
to? What do you like about your new job?
[61:34] (3694.40s)
Or, you know, let me know if I can help
[61:35] (3695.76s)
out with this particular project that
[61:37] (3697.36s)
you're working on. Right? I I feel like
[61:39] (3699.04s)
that's something I've always enjoyed
[61:40] (3700.72s)
doing. And it turned out that that has
[61:43] (3703.20s)
career value as well because you're able
[61:45] (3705.36s)
to get exposure to projects, people,
[61:47] (3707.84s)
ideas that you wouldn't know otherwise.
[61:49] (3709.60s)
Even like the things that we talked
[61:50] (3710.72s)
about in this conversation a couple
[61:52] (3712.08s)
times, like that debug tool I built at
[61:54] (3714.40s)
Meta came from me talking to a bunch of
[61:56] (3716.40s)
people and just like understanding their
[61:57] (3717.60s)
workflow. Me doing a lot of the job hops
[62:00] (3720.08s)
in my career have come from just again
[62:02] (3722.48s)
being kind of in the know on what are
[62:05] (3725.52s)
the people doing that I respect. And so
[62:07] (3727.68s)
I think that can be a repeatable
[62:09] (3729.44s)
algorithm or repeatable process that's
[62:11] (3731.44s)
not dependent on luck. I guess just
[62:13] (3733.12s)
change your approach to networking I
[62:16] (3736.48s)
guess or or like talking to people and
[62:18] (3738.88s)
that's a really good way to manufacture
[62:20] (3740.88s)
luck. And I think actually, you know,
[62:22] (3742.08s)
one thing that's just like maybe come
[62:23] (3743.36s)
present day and I think both me and you
[62:25] (3745.44s)
are pretty active on social media,
[62:27] (3747.76s)
right? Like we post a lot, maybe too
[62:30] (3750.08s)
much. And so I feel like part of it is
[62:32] (3752.32s)
of course like just genuine wanting to
[62:34] (3754.32s)
put out some value in the world
[62:36] (3756.00s)
hopefully. But also part of it is like
[62:37] (3757.84s)
that's a way to create luck, right? Like
[62:39] (3759.52s)
you are putting out content and people
[62:41] (3761.60s)
can see it and resonate with it, help
[62:43] (3763.12s)
them, and then they'll think of you when
[62:45] (3765.04s)
it comes to career growth. They'll think
[62:46] (3766.64s)
of you for a certain opportunity. And so
[62:49] (3769.04s)
that's a good example of yeah, it's kind
[62:50] (3770.72s)
of blocked because you don't know who's
[62:51] (3771.92s)
going to see your post, but at the same
[62:53] (3773.12s)
time that was a very deliberate thing
[62:54] (3774.72s)
and we probably spend many hours per
[62:56] (3776.48s)
week or per month thinking about what
[62:58] (3778.56s)
that will look like and how we can help
[62:59] (3779.92s)
people. Yeah. No, definitely agree. And
[63:02] (3782.24s)
I I've heard some people call this, you
[63:04] (3784.64s)
know, maximizing your luck surface area.
[63:06] (3786.96s)
And I think yeah, social media is one
[63:09] (3789.12s)
thing too, but even just wherever you
[63:11] (3791.92s)
are, maybe like internally at your
[63:13] (3793.84s)
company, I feel like writing or putting
[63:16] (3796.88s)
things out or reaching out to people,
[63:19] (3799.04s)
that visibility just gets you more
[63:21] (3801.12s)
opportunities. Probably part of the
[63:22] (3802.96s)
reason why you got the project that got
[63:24] (3804.96s)
you to staff, the one where you were
[63:27] (3807.04s)
helping with the big shared
[63:28] (3808.16s)
infrastructure initiative, you were you
[63:30] (3810.80s)
had relationships and credibility
[63:32] (3812.72s)
already because of you talking to
[63:35] (3815.84s)
people. you putting out writing that
[63:38] (3818.08s)
says, "Hey, I'm the person leading this
[63:40] (3820.00s)
initiative and hey, it was successful."
[63:42] (3822.96s)
That's essentially giving people reason
[63:45] (3825.44s)
to trust you and give you future
[63:47] (3827.52s)
opportunities, which increases your
[63:49] (3829.60s)
luck. I think one thing you said was
[63:51] (3831.20s)
about how you're good at, I guess, like
[63:52] (3832.72s)
reaching out to people and it sounded
[63:54] (3834.32s)
like what you were doing was really
[63:56] (3836.16s)
natural and I think when people talk
[63:58] (3838.16s)
about networking, it feels a little bit
[64:00] (3840.72s)
more manufactured. So, do you have any
[64:03] (3843.36s)
tip on how to quote unquote network with
[64:05] (3845.84s)
with people? Yeah, actually that's
[64:07] (3847.52s)
that's a really good call out. Like I I
[64:09] (3849.04s)
actually hesitated to use the word
[64:10] (3850.40s)
networking because I never really
[64:11] (3851.68s)
thought of it as networking for what
[64:13] (3853.44s)
I've been doing for most of my career. I
[64:15] (3855.60s)
think the things that I think about when
[64:16] (3856.96s)
I do it is one genuine curiosity. Like I
[64:19] (3859.60s)
genuinely am interested in what you're
[64:22] (3862.00s)
doing. How are you doing? Like how are
[64:23] (3863.76s)
you enjoying it or not enjoying whatever
[64:25] (3865.36s)
you're up to? That's part of it. And the
[64:27] (3867.20s)
second thing is being thoughtful about
[64:29] (3869.60s)
what are you sharing? I do think that
[64:31] (3871.84s)
one of the best ways to develop a
[64:33] (3873.52s)
relationship with someone is not just by
[64:35] (3875.20s)
asking a ton of questions or like asking
[64:36] (3876.72s)
for mentorship. A really good way to
[64:38] (3878.16s)
develop a relationship is say, "Hey,
[64:39] (3879.36s)
here's something I've worked on which
[64:40] (3880.72s)
might be interesting to you." The best
[64:42] (3882.32s)
way to get inbound is like to show off.
[64:45] (3885.36s)
Not maybe not show off is not the right
[64:46] (3886.64s)
word, but like to showcase um what
[64:49] (3889.20s)
you've been up to and like here's why
[64:51] (3891.44s)
you have a unique insight or a unique
[64:54] (3894.00s)
project that turns out to be a really
[64:56] (3896.24s)
interesting way or a really compelling
[64:58] (3898.32s)
way for people to like you create
[65:00] (3900.96s)
gravity. Like you gra people gravitate
[65:02] (3902.88s)
toward you because they want to get your
[65:06] (3906.00s)
opinion on things too. So it's like a
[65:07] (3907.36s)
two-way street. And if it's always if it
[65:08] (3908.96s)
feels like you're the one always asking
[65:11] (3911.12s)
and it's not reciprocated, then it could
[65:13] (3913.52s)
just be that person is not interested in
[65:15] (3915.04s)
you and that's time. But it could also
[65:16] (3916.56s)
be, hey, could you make yourself more
[65:17] (3917.92s)
interesting? And that that actually
[65:20] (3920.56s)
being a really good way to network.
[65:22] (3922.72s)
Yeah. Yeah. I remember when I was a new
[65:24] (3924.56s)
grad, people would say networking so
[65:27] (3927.76s)
important. And I thought, okay, so I'm
[65:29] (3929.92s)
supposed to, I guess, reach out to
[65:31] (3931.28s)
people and connect to them and this and
[65:33] (3933.44s)
it felt really artificial. And so I
[65:35] (3935.36s)
never really did it. And then more
[65:36] (3936.88s)
recently, I have all these these side
[65:39] (3939.60s)
things that, you know, I'm writing
[65:40] (3940.80s)
content or I'm I'm building like a
[65:42] (3942.64s)
keyboard on the side, this little
[65:44] (3944.80s)
project. And I've noticed that it has
[65:47] (3947.36s)
made conversations so much more natural
[65:50] (3950.24s)
because there's this unusual interesting
[65:53] (3953.44s)
side mission that I'm doing that people
[65:56] (3956.08s)
kind of checking in on. Also similarly
[65:58] (3958.32s)
like you have so much stuff too that
[65:59] (3959.92s)
you're working on that even when I just
[66:01] (3961.92s)
meet you we could probably talk for
[66:03] (3963.12s)
hours just going over the stuff that I'm
[66:06] (3966.08s)
curious about that you're working on. So
[66:08] (3968.24s)
I guess the the last thing that I'd like
[66:10] (3970.64s)
to go over and this is something that I
[66:12] (3972.32s)
ask everyone is if you were to go back
[66:14] (3974.96s)
to yourself at the end of college you're
[66:17] (3977.60s)
right about to enter the industry and
[66:19] (3979.92s)
you're going to give yourself some
[66:21] (3981.12s)
advice knowing everything that you know
[66:23] (3983.40s)
today. What is something that you tell
[66:26] (3986.64s)
yourself at the beginning of your career
[66:28] (3988.16s)
that you think would make the biggest
[66:29] (3989.76s)
difference? I think the thing I wish I
[66:32] (3992.56s)
realized way way earlier in my career is
[66:36] (3996.36s)
that there are no gatekeepers. Like you
[66:39] (3999.52s)
don't need permission from anyone when
[66:41] (4001.92s)
it comes to learning a technology or
[66:44] (4004.16s)
trying out something new. Like I think
[66:46] (4006.08s)
in school like I I did well in like high
[66:48] (4008.24s)
school. I did fairly well in college.
[66:49] (4009.60s)
Like I I think I was able to do that
[66:51] (4011.52s)
because I was very methodical and stious
[66:53] (4013.60s)
with whatever I was given. But I don't
[66:55] (4015.12s)
think I was as creative or like as
[66:57] (4017.80s)
exploratory as I could have been. Like
[66:59] (4019.84s)
for example like your project of
[67:01] (4021.52s)
building out a keyboard. That's so cool.
[67:03] (4023.12s)
Like you didn't need permission. You
[67:04] (4024.48s)
didn't no one told to do that. You just
[67:06] (4026.00s)
did it. And those are the things that I
[67:07] (4027.44s)
think are the most interesting. Even
[67:09] (4029.12s)
okay, build out a mobile app for fun or
[67:11] (4031.68s)
like I had this recent project now where
[67:13] (4033.68s)
I'm building out some extensions for a
[67:15] (4035.76s)
app launcher on my Mac. Like it's like
[67:17] (4037.68s)
random things. Like I think if I had
[67:19] (4039.52s)
learned earlier that you are empowered
[67:21] (4041.52s)
and you should feel like this desire to
[67:24] (4044.24s)
do something unique based off of what
[67:26] (4046.56s)
you care about rather than just doing
[67:28] (4048.32s)
what everyone else around you is doing
[67:29] (4049.84s)
or what the instructor or the manager is
[67:32] (4052.00s)
telling you to do. That is how you get
[67:33] (4053.76s)
an outlier outcome. And I wish I had
[67:37] (4057.44s)
tried harder to cultivate more creative
[67:39] (4059.60s)
interests, I would say, earlier on or at
[67:42] (4062.24s)
least allocated time to those creative
[67:44] (4064.40s)
interests in a much more deliberate way
[67:46] (4066.56s)
than what I did for most of my career.
[67:48] (4068.48s)
So, and it sounds like in the second
[67:50] (4070.64s)
half of your career, you started to take
[67:53] (4073.12s)
more of that initiative and kind of just
[67:55] (4075.28s)
will your way into creating the tools or
[67:59] (4079.04s)
this new company that you've been
[68:00] (4080.56s)
working on. And so, it sounds like
[68:01] (4081.92s)
that's made a big difference. Is that
[68:03] (4083.76s)
right? And you wish you had done that
[68:05] (4085.12s)
sooner. Yeah. Yeah. I mean, I feel like
[68:07] (4087.04s)
I got there eventually with like, okay,
[68:08] (4088.80s)
I made tutorials on YouTube and I I
[68:10] (4090.32s)
remember feeling so much joy when people
[68:12] (4092.32s)
started commenting on my YouTube
[68:13] (4093.44s)
tutorials like, "Oh, this is such a
[68:14] (4094.80s)
magical, helpful tutorial. Thank you for
[68:16] (4096.80s)
making it." I love that feeling. I
[68:18] (4098.88s)
published Android apps. I um started
[68:21] (4101.60s)
doing these like webinars with 800
[68:23] (4103.36s)
people. Like it felt like someone lift
[68:24] (4104.96s)
off the blindfolds and like you can do
[68:27] (4107.92s)
anything. Like you're not going to be
[68:29] (4109.44s)
ready to go start a company. you're not
[68:31] (4111.20s)
going to be ready to go like publish an
[68:33] (4113.44s)
app. You're not going to be ready to go
[68:34] (4114.72s)
teach people. Just do it now. And I
[68:36] (4116.96s)
think I wasn't this like wait and let me
[68:39] (4119.60s)
get better, let me get smarter, let me I
[68:41] (4121.76s)
don't know. So that's something about
[68:42] (4122.56s)
like just me being way more passive
[68:44] (4124.24s)
early on in my career. And until at some
[68:45] (4125.60s)
point I'm like, hey, I'm old enough.
[68:47] (4127.92s)
I've I've done enough. I like got a job
[68:51] (4131.12s)
already. Like what am I waiting for? Let
[68:52] (4132.96s)
me just go do it. I wish I had adopted
[68:54] (4134.96s)
that mindset way early. Even in like
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middle school or high school, I think
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it's not too early. But you can just
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start having that same mindset of
[69:02] (4142.56s)
creative expression or just like
[69:05] (4145.20s)
pursuing things that you care about way
[69:07] (4147.12s)
earlier way earlier on in life. Right.
[69:09] (4149.36s)
So it's kind of like the um the main
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character energy versus the NPC energy.
[69:14] (4154.96s)
Is that right? Yeah, I like that. Yeah.
[69:17] (4157.36s)
I mean it you don't have to be a main
[69:19] (4159.20s)
character in every domain of your life.
[69:20] (4160.48s)
Those kind of people might be kind of
[69:21] (4161.76s)
annoying to to be with like in certain
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domains. Like I think it's good to try
[69:26] (4166.16s)
and be the main character in like
[69:27] (4167.60s)
certain parts of your life at least, you
[69:29] (4169.60s)
know, like for things that you care
[69:31] (4171.36s)
about or things where you have a unique
[69:32] (4172.88s)
take. I like that. That's maybe a Yeah,
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don't be the NPC. Just be the main
[69:36] (4176.64s)
character. Awesome. Well, that's Yeah,
[69:38] (4178.08s)
that's everything. Thanks so much for
[69:39] (4179.92s)
sharing all this. I think there's so
[69:41] (4181.84s)
much gold in here for the audience. I
[69:43] (4183.84s)
really appreciate it. And at this point,
[69:45] (4185.68s)
if you want to plug anything, yeah,
[69:47] (4187.44s)
now's the time to do it. So anything you
[69:49] (4189.12s)
want to mention to for the audience? I
[69:50] (4190.96s)
mean we touched on it for a bit but like
[69:52] (4192.64s)
I mean I am working for the past two and
[69:53] (4193.92s)
a half years on this company called
[69:55] (4195.12s)
Taro. It is born out of my own
[69:56] (4196.96s)
experience in the tech industry like how
[69:59] (4199.12s)
do I grow my career? How do I figure out
[70:01] (4201.84s)
how to feel more confident, productive,
[70:04] (4204.64s)
get paid more money? And so if people
[70:08] (4208.56s)
are interested in that kind of stuff
[70:09] (4209.92s)
they want to get feedback or advice from
[70:12] (4212.16s)
really smart people who I respect. Like
[70:15] (4215.36s)
I've been working on that every day for
[70:16] (4216.80s)
the past two and a half years and I'm
[70:18] (4218.64s)
I'm really proud of kind of the
[70:20] (4220.16s)
knowledge that we've been able to
[70:21] (4221.12s)
accumulate. So people can check that out
[70:23] (4223.04s)
jointaro.com or you know just follow me
[70:25] (4225.44s)
or connect with me on LinkedIn. I'm
[70:26] (4226.96s)
happy to do whatever I can to help
[70:28] (4228.48s)
people. I'll put all the links to
[70:30] (4230.08s)
Rahul's uh YouTube to Taro to his
[70:32] (4232.48s)
LinkedIn as well. So you can see that in
[70:34] (4234.08s)
the show notes. Thanks for for for
[70:36] (4236.00s)
coming, Rahul. Yeah, thanks for having
[70:37] (4237.92s)
me. This was super fun. Hey everyone,
[70:39] (4239.60s)
Ryan here. Thanks for listening. I hope
[70:41] (4241.36s)
you enjoyed the conversation with Rahul.
[70:43] (4243.12s)
I really appreciated how transparent he
[70:45] (4245.12s)
was throughout the entire conversation.
[70:46] (4246.96s)
So, I hope that it was really helpful.
[70:48] (4248.72s)
You can take a look in the show notes. I
[70:50] (4250.32s)
left a bunch of links to him if you want
[70:51] (4251.84s)
to get more from Rahul. And if you have
[70:53] (4253.44s)
any feedback about the show, anything
[70:55] (4255.20s)
that you liked or that you disliked, I'd
[70:57] (4257.20s)
love to hear it. You can leave comments
[70:58] (4258.80s)
on YouTube. That's where I've been
[71:00] (4260.24s)
checking for feedback. I'll read every
[71:02] (4262.00s)
comment that I get. Also, if you have
[71:03] (4263.68s)
any requests for future guests or maybe
[71:06] (4266.24s)
questions that you wish I would have
[71:07] (4267.60s)
asked, would also love to hear that as
[71:09] (4269.36s)
well. Thanks again for listening and I
[71:10] (4270.96s)
hope to see you in a future